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Preface and Acknowledgments  
Alan Deardorff was 65 years old on June 6, 2009. To celebrate this occasion, a Festschrift in Alan’s 
honor was held on Friday and Saturday, October 2-3, 2009, in the Rackham Amphitheater at the 
University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. The Festschrift was entitled “Comparative Advantage, 
Economic Growth, and the Gains from Trade and Globalization: A Festschrift in Honor of Alan V. 
Deardorff.” It was co-organized by two of Alan’s former students, Drusilla Brown of Tufts 
University and Robert Staiger of Stanford University, together with Robert Stern representing the 
University of Michiga.  
The first day of the Festschrift involved a series of panels in which invited participants reflected on 
Alan’s contributions, including his writings on: comparative advantage; trade and growth; the gains 
from trade and globalization; and computational modeling and trade policy analysis. The panel 
participants prepared written comments, setting out their evaluation of Alan’s contributions 
combined with their own thoughts on the current state of knowledge and analysis of the particular 
topic. At the end of the first day, Paul Krugman of Princeton University and The New York Times 
delivered a Citigroup Foundation Special Lecture entitled “Reflections on Globalization: Yesteryear 
and Today.”  
The second day of the Festschrift involved "showcasing" the fruits of Alan's mentoring as an advisor, 
A number of Alan’s former students were invited to present whatever paper they were currently 
working on and were most excited about presenting at the Festschrift. Those invited included: 
Drusilla Brown, Tufts University; Peter Debaere, University of Virginia; David Hummels, Purdue 
University; Marc Melitz, Harvard University; Robert Staiger, Stanford University; and David 
Weinstein, Columbia University. Discussants were appointed to critique the individual papers. Day 2 
of the Festschrift was therefore more like a research seminar, with the paper presentations, and the 
link to Alan simply being that these were contributions from his former students. These papers were 
but a small sample of work by Alan’s former Ph.D students.  
The Festschrift was officially sponsored by the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy and the 
University of Michigan Department of Economics with generous support from the University of 
Michigan International Policy Center of the Ford School, College of Literature, Science, and the Arts, 
Office of the Vice President of Research, International Institute, the Stephen M. Ross School, and 
from John W. Sweetland.  
Robert M. Stern  
Ann Arbor, Michigan  








Tribute to Alan V. Deardorff  
 
Alan Deardorff is the John W. Sweetland Professor of International Economics and Professor of 
Economics and Public Policy in the Department of Economics and Gerald R. Ford School of Public 
Policy at the University of Michigan. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Cornell University in 
1971 and has been on the faculty at the University of Michigan since 1970. He served as Chair of the 
Department of Economics from 1991 to 1995.  
He has also served as a consultant to many government agencies and international organizations, 
including the Departments of State, Treasury, and Labor of the United States Government, and the 
UN Conference on Trade and Development, and he is currently on the editorial boards of several 
academic journals. His many publications span a large variety of topics dealing with international 
trade theory and policy. His writings on international trade theory have dealt primarily with the 
theory of comparative advantage and the Heckscher-Ohlin and other models that explain the patterns 
and effects of international trade. His writings on trade policy have included analyses of anti-
dumping laws, the safeguards clause of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and 
arguments for and against extending intellectual property protection to developing countries.  
Together with Professor Robert Stern, he has developed a computer-based model of production, trade, 
and employment in 34 major countries of the world. This model has been used for a variety of 
purposes, including analysis of the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations and 
possible outcomes of the current World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round. He, Professor Stern, 
and Drusilla K. Brown of Tufts University have also developed a series of models to evaluate the 
sectoral employment implications of various regional trading arrangements in North America, the 
Western Hemisphere, Asia, and Europe.  
Over the course of his career, Professor Deardorff has authored/co-authored five books and 
monographs, six edited volumes, and nearly 90 academic papers. He has also published 84 
conference papers in edited volumes.  
Professor Deardorff currently maintains two widely used websites: Academic Family Tree of Trade 
Economists, since 2001, and The Terms of Trade and Other Wonders: Deardorff's Glossary of 
International Economics, since 1998  
In recognition of his many accomplishments, Professor Deardorff has been honored and has 
delivered a number of special, invited lectures, including the Graham Lecture at Princeton University 
in 2006, Nottingham Lectures at the University of Nottingham in 2005, the Ohlin Lectures at the 
Stockholm School of Economics in 2003, and the World Economic Lecture at the University of 
Nottingham in 2002.  Professor Deardorff's recent and current topics of theoretical research include 
the role of trade costs in determining patterns of trade, the determinants of international 
specialization, and the mechanisms by which trade liberalization may stimulate industrialization and 
growth. 
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Deardorff Festschrift – October 2-3, 2009 
 
For years, The University of Michigan, as well as its colleges, schools, and departments, 
operated under the policy best described by Senator Moynihan of “benign neglect” toward its 
alumni. As a result, I had little contact with the College of LS&A, the Rackham School, or the 
Department of Economics from which I received both my bachelor’s and master’s degrees in the 
late 50s.  
This began to change under President Harold Shapiro – formerly a professor of 
economics at Michigan – as he realized that the University had to look beyond state funding in 
major ways if it were to achieve its potential. Under his leadership, the Campaign for Michigan 
began and was carried out by his provost, then President Jim Duderstadt. Its goal was $1 billion 
– the largest ever sought by a state‐supported university. It was a success at $1.4 billion, but 
more importantly, it brought out of the shadows thousands of loyal – and generous – alums. 
Since then, the recent $2.5 billion Michigan Difference Campaign, which ended last year, topped 
$3.2 billion and placed Michigan in the lead among state universities with the largest per student 
endowment among its peers.  
It was this series of events that brought Alan and me into the same orbit. I had some 
reasonable degree of success ignoring what I was taught at Michigan by creating the largest 
cement import operation in the U.S. with facilities on the east and west coasts. Cement, I was 
taught, was too low value a commodity to be involved in international trade. By the early 90s 
when we sold our companies to Cemex and Lafarge, some 20% of the cement consumed in the 
United States was imported from Canada, Europe and the Far East.  
Shortly thereafter, I received a call from a Southern Californian alumnus who asked if he 
could bring Saul Hymans to my office for a visit. I knew who Saul was because the Research 
Seminar in Quantitative Economics was well known in national circles. Saul’s visit was the first 
step in my reintroduction to Michigan and the economics department. To those here from the 
academic community, please don’t turn down such opportunities. Former students that I have 
talked to uniformly feel honored by such a meeting – they want to hear what’s happening!  
Soon the romance became more serious. Would I consider a gift to the Campaign for 
Michigan? That grew into a request that I fund a Chair in Economics for a major number – at 
least for me! I decided to create the Chair in International Economics even though my field of 
concentration was industrial organization. My reason? I very much enjoyed my Michigan 
experience, but the late 50s was a slow time in international trade. Europe and Japan were still 
recovering from World War II, most of the U.S. trade was exports – the first Volkswagen didn’t 
appear until the late 50s and was viewed as a joke by the U.S. auto industry – and there was little 
evidence that change was coming quickly. My experience in developing new cement plants in 
Greece and Spain in the 60s, a time in the securities industry in the 70s bringing our investment 
products in Europe into compliance with the German equivalent of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission legislation and extensive anti‐dumping litigation brought by domestic cement 
companies against our operations in the 80s, created an awareness that institutions like Michigan 
needed to look to the world and broaden the scope of their studies.  
I then learned that the Department had the ideal candidate in mind to hold the first 
endowed chair at Michigan in Economics. Described as a scholar, a teacher, an author, a person 
with striking intelligence and a prodigious appetite for work, a recent chair of the department 





It has been a pleasure knowing Alan these past twelve years. I’ve had an opportunity to 
teach one introductory class in International Economics for each of the past 10 years. From this 
vantage, I could sense the student’s respect for Alan and the high regard they have for him. I’m 
honored to have a part in this celebration.  
 
Citigroup Foundation Special Lecture  
by Paul Krugman 
 
Hill Auditorium, University of Michigan 
October 2, 2009 
Introduction1 
Good afternoon and welcome. I am Susan Collins, the Joan and Sanford Weill 
Dean of the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy. And I am simply delighted to see all 
of you and welcome you here on behalf of the Ford School, the International Policy 
Center, and the Department of Economics. It is really wonderful to have so much interest 
in our speaker today, who I will introduce in just a moment.  
But as most of you know, we had to move the venue because of that interest, and I 
would like to thank Hill Auditorium for wedging us in, in the midst of performances by the 
University Symphony Band.  
It is a great honor and a personal pleasure to welcome Paul Krugman to campus as 
the Ford School’s 2009 Citigroup Foundation lecturer. This lecture series was established 
several years ago by the Citigroup Foundation as a gift in honor of Gerald R. Ford. We are 
very grateful to the Foundation for their generous gift, which has enabled us to bring 
distinguished policy leaders to campus, and we are extremely honored this afternoon to be 
able to add Professor Paul Krugman's name to the list of our Citigroup lecturers.  
Today's lecture is the keynote address for an academic conference we are hosting 
on campus today and tomorrow. The conference was organized in honor of the 
distinguished career of our colleague and friend, Professor Alan Deardorff, who is 
currently the Associate Dean of the Ford School. Alan's wide ranging and astute 
                                                 
1 This Introduction and Paul Krugman’s lecture to follow are based on the editing of the transcript 
prepared for the occasion. 
 
 
contributions have furthered our understanding of why countries trade, the implications for 
growth, and the impact of trade policy in a globalizing world. And the conference has also 
brought many of the world's leading trade economists to Ann Arbor, and I am very pleased 
to welcome all of them here today as well.  
Well, like many of those conference attendees, I am an international economist. 
And while I am very proud of my profession and its contributions, I do have to concede 
that there are not many economists whose work is followed closely by the general public, 
whose opinions on economic matters stir great passions among lay people, and whose 
weekly writings are routinely discussed around the water cooler. Well, Paul Krugman is 
the exception. Whether they agree with him or not, people from all walks of life want to 
know what Paul has to say.  
In just the past few days, for example, he has appeared in quite disparate settings 
such as the keynote speaker at a conference in Helsinki on Finland’s Economic 
Competitiveness and as a guest on the HBO show, Real Time, with Bill Maher. Paul's even 
a hit over at YouTube where a little known performer scored a quarter of a million views 
with his song, and I promise I won't sing it for you, his song, Hey, Paul Krugman. And if 
you have not checked out the YouTube video, I encourage you to do so.  
But of course they do not award Nobel Prizes for popularity or YouTube hits. Paul 
Krugman is one of the great economists of our time, and he was awarded the Nobel Prize 
for his analysis of trade patterns and the location of economic activity. Traditional theories 
of international trade emphasize why countries are different, and why they trade with each 
other, exporting and importing different products. Paul's work emphasized that much of the 
trade we see in the real world is between countries that are quite similar, and they are 
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trading relatively similar products. His models highlight both that firms can take advantage 
of economies of scale, that is, produce more cheaply by producing large quantities, and 
that consumers value variety and choice. Thus, he pioneered models of trade in which 
firms produce similar products and compete in a globalizing marketplace. These models 
also link globalization to economic geography, helping us to understand where firms and 
people choose to locate and why. Paul's academic work stands out because of its insights 
about the real world, in packages that economists love because they are mathematically 
elegant and deceptively simple. His work on trade, like his work on financial crises and in 
so many other areas, has launched new avenues of research and literally thousands of 
academic papers.  
Paul's work is also remarkable for its clarity. The lucidity of the writing in his many 
articles, books, and columns has significantly raised economic literacy around the globe, 
and as Dean of a policy school, I particularly want to highlight his dedication to the 
importance of clear, analytic thinking as a guide for policy. On a more personal note, I can 
also attest to the fact that Paul has educated and inspired generations of international and 
policy-oriented economists. Nearly 30 years ago, his course on international trade was one 
of the first courses that I took in my doctoral studies at MIT, and I also had the great 
fortune to benefit from Paul's insights and perspective as a member of my dissertation 
committee and at numerous points during my career. For all of those reasons and more, I 
could not be more pleased to call to the stage our 2009 Citigroup Foundation lecturer. 




Reflections on Globalization: Yesterday and Today 
Paul Krugman 
Princeton University 
Well, thanks, Susan, and thank you all for coming. I would like to thank the Ford 
School and the Economics Department for organizing this event, and especially the 
Festschrift to celebrate the work of Alan Deardorff. Today is a kind of homecoming for 
me. This is the world in which I started. Because today’s occasion is the conference 
honoring Alan Deardorff's work, I am going to try to address different things than what I 
mostly talk about these days. Everyone wants to know about the economic crisis, and I will 
talk about that a bit at the end, and I am sure it will come up in the questions. But at least 
for starters, I want to talk about my home territory, originally and academically, which is 
the topic of international trade and globalization.  
And since today is really all about honoring Alan Deardorff, I thought I would 
reminisce for a moment. I got into international economics coming straight out of graduate 
school in the late 1970s and joined what was then the conference circuit where 
international economists would meet and many of whom are here now and so somehow 
they all look older. That has not happened to me of course. Alan Deardorff was at many of 
the meetings I attended in the late ‘70s, early ‘80s. He was extremely distinctive because 
he was an American, which at the time was quite rare. When I got into international 
economics, there were only a few Americans and most others came from other places. The 
way I thought about it was that it was a field dominated by Colonials, some Indians, but 
mostly Canadians and Australians, it seemed at the time. That is probably not true literally, 
but there were an awful lot of them, which actually imparted a certain character to the 
conferences. I was later able to pinpoint this character.  
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Initially I would go to these meetings, and they were incredible. I would come 
home exhausted, even though I was much younger then obviously. But even so, I really 
was having a hard time, and then I actually went to one with a bad cold and was taking 
cough and cold medicine and could not drink. I did not dare to drink, which is funny 
because there were all these Canadians and Australians and an awful lot of beer and 
alcohol at these meetings.  
There was a reason why Americans were not that prevalent in international 
economics at the time because even then international trade did not seem to be that big a 
deal for the United States. In 1970, which is about when a lot of people who were on the 
conference circuit then would have made their decisions to be in international economics, 
imports were only about 5 percent of GDP. Now they are 17 percent. So we have had this 
explosion of international trade, which has turned what was at the time a little bit of a back 
water within economics, into something that has become enormously important. So I want 
then to talk about globalization and what it has done, and finish by talking about the role of 
globalization and the mess we are now in.  
But I want to first talk a little bit about history, about the forces of globalization. So 
the first thing you should know in terms of the history is that globalization is not a new 
phenomenon. It was ongoing in the late 19th century, encouraged by such key inventions as 
the railroad, steamship, and telegraph. There was a very extensive local economy created 
in the late 19th century. There is a lot to be learned even now from studying that period. 
But after World War I, the global economy went into abeyance for a long time. Between 
the two world wars, there was the Great Depression and protectionism, and a shift by much 
of the world to inward looking strategies of economic development. Globalization receded 
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significantly. By 1970, world trade as a share of gross world product was probably only 
back to around what it had been in 1913. Other aspects of globalization were nowhere near 
their pre-World War I levels. There was not nearly as much flow of capital. Even now, 
despite all the talk about immigration, there is still less migration of people than there was 
earlier because there are many legal barriers now that did not exist then, and the legal 
barriers, although porous, do actually matter.  
But just about the time that I was getting into international economics, just about 
the time that I first met Alan Deardorff, all that was about to change. Now there has been 
some return. While international trade had grown substantially in the '60s and '70s, it had 
done so in a kind of limited fashion. Most of what we would now consider the emerging 
markets were still inwardly turned in their economic policies. What was happening was 
that there were agreements that had opened up trade between quite similar countries. There 
was a lot of trade between the United States and Canada and within Western Europe. But 
much of what we now think of as globalization, certainly China was not yet in the picture 
and even the smaller Asian economies were barely there. Things did not look the way they 
look now.  
The analytical work that I and others did became a whole movement that ended up 
with the interesting event for me in Stockholm, was largely about growth and trade, trying 
to understand why the United States and Canada, which look so similar to each other, do 
so much trade. Why France and Germany ship automobiles back and forth to each other. It 
is kind of the way things tend to work in economics that as soon as you have a theory, the 
world starts moving in a way to make the theory less and less relevant, and so we have 
actually in some ways moved back to a completely different world, which in some ways, 
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but not in all, resembles the kind of trade that we had in that first age of globalization, 
before World War I.  
What has changed? Two things I think really, and they were both happening 
together. When many of us were first involved in the Handbook of International 
Economics at a conference in Princeton in 1982, we had no idea in fact that the world was 
totally changing, and in a way that certainly I had no sense of at the time.  
Two things were really changing. One was technology. The ability to ship things 
long distances fairly cheaply has been there since the steamship and the railroad. What was 
the big bottleneck was getting things on and off the ships. A large part of the cost of 
international trade was taking the cargo off of the ship, sorting it out, and dealing with the 
pilferage that always took place along the way. So, the first big thing that changed was the 
introduction of the container. When we think about technology that changed the world, we 
think about glamorous things like the internet. But if you try to figure out what happened 
to world trade, there is a really strong case to be made that it was the container, which 
could be hauled off a ship and put onto a truck or a train and moved on. It used to be the 
case that ports were places with thousands and thousands of longshoremen milling around 
loading and unloading ships. Now longshoremen are like something out of one of those 
science fiction movies in which people have disappeared and been replaced by machines.  
I have just been rereading a very good book called The Box, which is about the big 
change that occurred between the late 1970s and mid '80s, with a sharp drop in the cost of 
transactions. This opened up the world and made it possible to do what we do now, which 
is to produce a good in many different places with the different stages of production and 
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different components. At this point, ask yourself where an iPod is made and the answer is 
that it is a really complicated question to answer.  
The other thing that changed was policy. To some extent, in countries like the 
United States, we had actually already moved quite a long way towards free trade. What 
really changed was that many of the developing countries had followed, for 35 years after 
World War II, a policy of looking inward, of encouraging production for the domestic 
market. Whether by design or simply because that is the way the policy works, it ended up 
discouraging exports. What later followed was a great shift towards outward-looking 
policies, allowing foreign trade to become the engine for growth. The most extreme case, 
of course, was China, which went from virtually closed to the world to extremely open. 
And all of a sudden, with this explosion of world trade over a relatively short period of 
time, trade was no longer interesting just to Canadians, for whom it has always been of 
keen interest because they have their large neighbor to the south. It was also of great 
interest to all of us Americans.  
What do we know about globalization? I think even now we do not have clear 
knowledge and are still adjusting our stories. In fact I have actually been changing my own 
story about globalization a little bit in the last few months because I have been noticing 
things that I was not paying sufficient attention to. I really should have been more aware, 
given my interest in globalization and trade. So let me now tell you what I did on my 
summer vacation. I actually took a vacation, “holidaying in Scotland,” relatively recently, 
and it was kind of depressing. What can an economist do on vacation? They can go to 
museums that are focused on economics. So in Dundee, Scotland, there is the Verdant 
Works Museum, which is dedicated to the history of the Dundee jute industry.  
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If you have not been there, you may think of Dundee − with the name it sounds like 
some cute little town. But it is a grim industrial city trying to claw its way back to what it 
once was. Industrially, it was “juteopolis,” the center of the world’s jute trade and a long 
way from its source of jute in the late 19th century. Taking the fibers, which came from 
India, treating them, drawing them, and eventually ending up as burlap bags, it became a 
huge business. Dundee had more wealth per capita than any other place in Britain.  
How should we think about Dundee? Part of it was comparative advantage, which 
has long pervaded our thinking, insofar as countries trade because they are different. They 
have different resources, different competencies, and they trade in effect to take advantage 
of these differences. Obviously Britain had to import the jute because it could not be 
grown in Scotland for sure. The manufacturing was taking place in Britain because Britain 
had the capital, the technological skill, and the certain kinds of skilled labor in a way that 
India at the time was lacking. Later on, actually, the industry moved back to India in the 
course of their development. But initially, at least, it was something that could be done 
more efficiently in Britain. But that is not the whole story because it does not say why you 
would be manufacturing in Dundee.  
And there the answer is much closer to the kinds of things that I have spent a lot of 
time thinking about in my career, which is the role of increasing returns. As is 
characteristic of these stories, there are some accidental historical factors that got the 
industry started. In the early stages, the process of treating the fibers relied on whale oil. 
While it later turned to mineral oil, initially it was whale oil, and Dundee was a whale 
importer. It also had ample supplies of flax. The clustering that took place eventually 
resulted in the production process feeding on itself. 
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Some years ago, many of us became interested in economic geography and 
rediscovered the works of the great Victorian economist Alfred Marshall,  who focused on 
these industrial clusters that were very much a story of the time. Marshall emphasized 
three things. First,  there was the creation of a thick market for specialized skilled labor. 
Second, there were specialized suppliers of equipment and services needed in industry, 
and, third, there was what we would now call technological spillover. Marshall referred to 
the mysteries of the trade, but there was no mystery as the developments were in the air. 
Basically, everybody in Dundee knew all about jute, and so you have this kind of 
clustering. And that is actually quite typical. If you go back, we tend to think of 19th 
century trade as having been straightforward. There were different countries, tropical and 
temperate. There were countries that knew how to do manufacturing and countries that did 
not — there was actually a lot of clustering going on, not only jute in Dundee, but hosiery 
and lace in Nottingham, and cutlery in Sheffield. This was the case in the United States as 
well. Although the United States was protectionist and relatively closed at the time, we 
also had Patterson, New Jersey, which was the equivalent of Nottingham, and Troy, New 
York, which was the detachable collar and cuff center. Well, I always love these historical 
examples.  
What about today's world? Today's world is extraordinarily complex, with 
enormous volumes of trade. When I was first getting into this, we could say that, in some 
ways, globalization still falls short of what it was in the Edwardian era. We cannot say that 
now. Now, what we have that did not exist in the past is these complex supply chains in 
which there are many stages of production. Take the iPod. The iPod's final assembly point 
is in China, but that assembly involves only about $1.50 of the price of the iPod. For the 
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rest, there are many other stages involving a large number of countries, which creates 
tremendous shipping back and forth. A lot of this now reflects again differences between 
countries. The wealthy countries still have advantages. They have still somewhat better 
technology. They have more skilled labor. They have all of the advantages of being in an 
advanced country environment in which there is quality control.  
While I have not seen it, I understand that there is a new book called Badly Made in 
China. While even now there are still differences in competence, on the other hand, 
developing countries have inexpensive labor and in some cases reasonably good 
productivity and manufacturing capability. Thus, we have trade going back and forth that 
is based upon these differences. The goods and stages are still required to be produced in 
advanced country environments, but other stages are done in developing countries. What is 
going on is similar to my story about Dundee. Except what is interesting these days is that 
if you want to find those clearly defined industrial clusters, those cities where a particular 
sort of narrow competence leads to a dominance of the whole city economy, you find them 
best in the emerging markets in the developing world.  
If you go around China, you will find, comparable to Dundee that was the 
“juteopolis” in the late 19th century, the “underwear” city of Yambol in the 21st century. 
There are these clusters. It is probably a foregone conclusion that we are going to have 
labor-intensive apparel produced in China or now moving down to even lower wage 
countries like Vietnam. But the details depend a lot on whether some particular town or 
city can develop a specialty and derive the advantages of this clustering, that is, the 
advantages of the scale of production in a particular locality.  
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I should mention by the way, since again this is Alan Deardorff's Festschrift, that 
this whole process of fragmentation of production, which has made it possible to have this 
huge volume of world trade, is one of the areas in which he has done much. When we were 
just starting to see the surge in exports from smaller Asian countries, we used to say that 
there is only a limited amount of these labor-intensive manufactures that they can export. I 
remember specifically saying what will happen when China tries to do this? There is not 
possibly enough labor-intensive manufactures to be able to segment the production of 
goods based on these labor-intensive stages of production.  
Nonetheless, the process of fragmentation has gained a lot of momentum because 
of the interaction of technological and political changes. The technological changes meant 
that some countries could do very well by integrating with the global economy, which led 
other countries to be more willing to liberalize their policies and do the same thing, which 
resulted in the explosive growth of globalization. The question is whether this is a good 
thing or a bad thing. The answer of course is, yes.  
First of all, the world economy is richer because of the increased globalization. It is 
richer both because we have countries concentrating on the things they do relatively well. 
Note that this does not mean they do absolutely well. Actually, on any given thing, it is 
almost certain that U.S. labor is more productive than Chinese labor, although this varies 
quite a lot. So by having the Chinese do the things in which they are relatively productive, 
we get the whole world producing efficiently, and this means that world wealth has 
increased. In addition, the world market makes it possible to do a lot of things on an 
efficient scale. In some cases, this is not just by having a really big factory, but in many 
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cases having many factories in a place where the firms produce mutually reinforcing 
advantages.  
 
Thus, in the end, the world is a richer place because the underwear makers of 
Yambol are more efficient than any national, purely domestic, market-oriented underwear 
city could be. So we have a world that is clearly richer. That does not mean that everybody 
benefits equally, since there are many dislocations and distributional effects. The most 
obvious and the one that we worry about a lot is that workers with lower formal education 
in advanced countries are almost certainly hurt by imports. That inequality is wider to 
some extent because of globalization. I would argue that the evidence still suggests that 
this is a secondary factor. But inequality has widened, and globalization is probably part of 
it and has probably hurt workers in advanced countries.  
If you take a global citizen point of view though, you may want to say that those 
losses are less dramatic than the huge gains that many workers have achieved in the 
developing world. There is a real trap here for concerned people in the advanced world. 
That is, there is a tendency to compare the ugly reality of life for workers in today's 
developing countries with an abstraction of what some may think it ought to be or with an 
idealized picture of what it used to be like, rather than with reality. So sometimes it almost 
comes out as condescending thinking about happy peasants living their traditional lives in 
comparison with the actual lives of workers, which may be terrible. But the fact of the 
matter is, given the reality, that developing countries were incredibly poor in 1970, that 
some of them have now achieved a really large increase in their standard of living. Even if 
this still looks pretty bad to us, there has nonetheless been a tremendous amount of 
13 
 
progress. Hundreds and perhaps billions of people now live better lives because of 
globalization. But it is a mixed picture, and it has also turned out to be much harder than I 
think many economists believed to actually reap those gains from globalization.  
When the great takeoff of some East Asian economies took place, a lot of people 
thought that if you just opened yourself up to world markets, the benefits will be obvious. 
A number of countries, particularly in Latin America, did open themselves up to world 
markets and have not achieved great results.. So it has turned out that there is a much more 
mixed and more uncertain picture than we were hoping it would be. But if you had asked 
me two years ago how globalization is going, I would have said, well it is certainly not 
wonderful, but there are a lot of good things that have taken place. And that, on the whole, 
globalization has been a force for good.  
But, as we all know, something happened to us recently, so we now have the world 
economy going through this terrible crisis. What can we say about the role of globalization 
in this and the future of globalization? Where are we currently? And by the way, of course 
− if you read your history − you cannot help but recall that the single biggest force killing 
the original global economy was the Great Depression of the 1930s. We are now in a world 
slump that bears a definite family resemblance to what happened in the early 1930s. Is it 
all going to happen again? What does it say about where we are going for now?  
The current crisis has been awesome of course. The first year of the crisis tracks the 
(Great) Depression very closely. It actually turns out that the initial fall in industrial 
production was not as big as it was in 1929 and 1930, but the initial fall in world trade in 
the current crisis was actually sharper than it was in 1929 and 1930. While the fall in GDP 
in the current crisis may have been of the Great Depression scale, it does appear to have 
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stabilized. So it appears that Armageddon has been put on hold for at least a while. The 
apocalypse has been postponed, but it has been a pretty shocking crisis and of course we 
are nowhere near being out of the woods.  
It is interesting to ask whether globalization paved the way for the crisis. Well 
certainly not in the simple sense that all this increased trade was directly responsible for 
the crisis. In this case, if you want to look for causes of the crisis, you should look more at 
the financial side of globalization, which of course is not independent. So, if you are 
looking for where things went wrong, you might say that, as China became more deeply 
integrated into the world economy, it also stumbled into a policy of accumulating huge 
reserves, which led to a lot of cheap money in the United States that helped feed our 
housing bubble. This is an indirect chain but certainly is part of the story. You would also 
say that, in a more limited sense, we tend to think of this crisis as having been a primarily 
U.S. event. But actually, much happened in Europe as well, and their more localized 
globalization played a big role. That is, there was a lot of lending to Eastern European 
emerging nations that was in its own way as big and imbalanced as the U.S.-China 
imbalance and has ended in similarly severe grief.  
So you can certainly say that the opening up of world capital markets, the opening 
up of world capital flows, played a definite role in generating the current crisis. 
Globalization has certainly therefore played a role in propagating the crisis.  
One of the things that has been remarkable is that you know obviously the places of 
the financial excesses were in the United States, the U.K., and arguably in different ways 
in some of the European countries that had enormous housing bubbles, such as in Spain. 
But the punishment has not been borne, if you look cross country, very much in 
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relationship to the crime. Thus, the steepest falls in GDP, at least initially, actually came in 
countries that did not have runaway financial sectors and did not have housing bubbles, in 
particular Japan and Germany. After all, what was their sin? Their sin was being deeply 
integrated in the world economy and being exporters of durable manufactured goods, 
which took the biggest hit. So the biggest declines in GDP, at least initially, have come in 
countries that were being hit through world trade, and all of this is possible because we 
have such an integrated global economy. And that contributes to what is in some ways the 
most troubling feature of this crisis looking forward, which is that it hit everybody.  
There is another sense in which globalization helped lead to a synchronized crisis, 
and this is a little bit softer but still very important. One of the effects of globalization has 
been people looking for profit, which involves movement of goods and services and 
money. It also produces an integration of thought. More and more, we are all certainly 
culture bound. There has been concern about the horrors of cultural homogenization, which 
is, whatever you think of it, very real. We certainly all dress alike around the world. We all 
watch the same kind of entertainment, and we all think alike. This means that with 
intellectual trends, the conventional wisdom at the moment is now a global convention 
rather than a national convention of wisdom. And, in particular, pretty much everyone 
around the world thought it was a great idea to deregulate banking at the same time so that 
when the house of cards came down, it came down everywhere, which makes this very 
difficult currently.  
We have had an awesome financial crisis. It is not, now that we have seen it 
happen, that hard to understand. We look at it, and it is a more or less historically standard 
banking crisis but dressed in different clothes. So, if you go back to the early 1930s, there 
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was a wave of banking failures and bank runs, and such things have happened in individual 
countries since then. This time, we had pretty good guarantees for banks as conventionally 
defined, that is, basically big marble buildings that take deposits. The trouble was that we 
had failed to do anything about the growth of institutions that functionally are banks, 
borrowing short and lending long, but were not called banks, did not look like banks, and 
were not strictly speaking depository institutions. But once you take all of this into 
account, what we have had is the 21st century functional equivalent of 1931 around the 
world. So this time, bank runs do not consist of hordes of people out in the street banging 
on the doors. They consist of hordes of people on the internet clicking their mouses, but it 
has the same effect and is played out very similarly. And we have had, thank God, a pretty 
big-risk emergency response. We have learned something these past 75 years and appeared 
to have contained it from being a total collapse.  
But what comes next? Well, we have had a number of more localized banking 
crises around the world since the Great Depression. We have had Mexico and Argentina, 
and then Mexico again, and then Argentina again, and the Asian countries, and Sweden 
and Finland. All of these crises were very nasty. We know that the IMF has done a lot of 
reaching back in history to ask what happens in a crisis, and the answer is that financial 
crises not only are severe but may take a long time to recover. There is one other thing that 
becomes very clear from the record, which is that with all modern financial crises, the 
economic recovery relies crucially on the same thing, which is that the crisis-afflicted 
country recovers to a large extent at least for a while, by running big trade surpluses. It 
basically pulls itself out of its hole by selling a lot of goods and services to parts of the 
world that were not caught up in the crisis. I think you see the problem. Unless we can find 
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another planet to export to, the normal exit from a financial crisis, not the stabilization 
itself, which I think has been achieved, but the actual return to something that looks like a 
reasonably fully employed economy is not clearly available. I see crisis-afflicted countries 
like Argentina, the East Asian economies, or even Japan emerging temporarily from its lost 
decade of growth, being able to recover through export surpluses. But this may no longer 
be available under the present circumstances.  
So if you are looking for a precedent for a world economy managing to emerge 
from a financial crisis and fully recovering from the effects of the crisis, where everybody 
is caught up in it and where countries are not able to do it by running trade surpluses, you 
actually have to go back to recovery from the Great Depression itself, when the full 
recovery was achieved through a large public spending program known as World War II. 
So it is not a very encouraging prospect  
The last time we had a global crisis in the Great Depression, one of the effects was 
to roll back globalization for a long period of time. This does not seem to be happening 
right now. Although, yes, there are tariffs being imposed on tires and other products, but 
there has been nothing like the kind of protectionist response that took place in the 1930s, 
and not much sign that it is going to happen. The question I guess one might ask is, maybe, 
should it happen? We seem to have a global economy in which our institutions have been 
lagging. We are not in a position in  managing to find global solutions to the crisis. We are 
just managing to find ad hoc patches to keep the global economy from totally falling apart. 
We are to a certain extent holding the economy together with scotch tape and chewing 
gum. But is there a reason, given the crisis, to roll back globalization? I think you could 
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actually possibly make that case, but I do not think that it is going to happen because the 
advantages of globalization are still very real.  
It is widely understood that protectionism was a major cause of the Great 
Depression. This is perhaps arguably not true, and in any case it stands out as a cautionary 
tale. This means that we need to find a way to deal with the crisis. One way to look at the 
world right now is that we actually created this global economy without creating the 
institutions that we need to manage it. We are still in a world of national policies. Even 
though we have supranational institutions, they are not functioning very well. So, for 
example, the European Union (EU) is looking awfully disunited when it comes to 
economic policies these days. While the EU members are highly interdependent, yet they 
do not seem to be able to make policies jointly.  
We have had international cooperation with some of the emergency measures in the 
crisis, but they have been amazingly dependent on personal contact. You could argue that 
we managed to save the world basically because Jean Claude Richet, Mervin King, and 
Ben Bernanke were able to agree on things that needed to be done in the heat of the 
moment. And while I would like to have a rule that the believers of policies would always 
be in the hands of smart, bearded Princeton professors, that is not something we can really 
count on in the future. So we have not yet come to terms with this enormously, moral 
degrading economy. This economy that I have to admit 30 years ago, when I was getting 
into international trade, I never imagined that it would be this relevant, and we have no 
choice in the end. One could imagine rolling back trade flows in the face of a crisis. It is 
not technologically impossible to go back to a world of relatively inward looking 





does not care where a ton of carbon dioxide gets emitted, and we are now at a stage where 
those global constraints bind enormously on all of us. In fact, we are globalized whether 
we like it or not.  
It is an amazing and frightening time. I would like to think that we will come out of 
all this with the understanding that we really need to go beyond just trusting this vast 
global economic machine to do the right thing and figuring that we actually need to have 
some adult supervision of the entire system. Maybe it will actually happen. We are 
supposed to be optimistic, right, otherwise what is the point? So amazing times. As a 
citizen of the world, I am quite horrified of what we are going through. A little less 
frightened than I was six months ago but still uneasy with the prospect.  
But this is an occasion to analyze economic research and to celebrate the 
accomplishments of Alan Deardorff. As an economic researcher, I have to say that I am in 
clover. It is like watching Mount St. Helens erupt, a great time for study, unfortunately not 
a great time to live through. Thank you.2  
                                                 
2 Following the lecture, there were a number of questions posed by the audience to which Professor 
Krugman responded. These questions covered a variety of issues, many of which were not germane 
to the subject of the lecture. The questions and Professor Krugman’s responses are available on 
request. 
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Alphabetical order puts me at the head of a distinguished panel with far
more authority than I to speak on the subject of comparative advantage. I
will be appropriately brief. But perhaps my perspective as a consumer rather
than a producer here will be useful.
In my opinion the writings of Alan Deardoff on comparative advantage
are a great example of progress in economic theory and its connection to
empirical confirmation. Almost 30 years later, it seems like we have always
known these ideas. Appreciating the greatness of his 1980 and 1982 papers
requires recalling the scene in which they appeared.
The theory of comparative advantage before 1980 was a compelling and
beautiful insight essentially based on a toy world of two goods and two coun-
tries. The factor proportions theory of comparative advantage gave addi-
tional compelling insights in special cases such as two factors or factor price
equalization. Only a little more generality had been achieved.
Moreover, technical difficulties with the logic of comparative advantage
in a world of costly trade were suggested by demonstrations that introducing
or changing trade costs could reverse the direction of trade in some goods.
The distance of the assumptions from the real world was so extreme that
empirical confirmation seemed impossible.
Those of us teaching trade theory in the 70’s felt there must be some truth
to the logic, but comparative advantage was like a parable, not science. We
might have been accused of mistaking mathematical beauty for economic
truth, a charge Krugman recently leveled at the macro-economic work of the
last 25 years.
Progress made in the 70’s in refining the dual approach to modeling trade
1
set the stage for using the mathematics of convex structure to analyze com-
parative advantage in high dimensions.
Alan discovered (more or less simultaneously with Dixit and Norman) the
basic logic of comparative advantage extended to many goods and countries,
many factors, without factor price equalization, and with costly trade. His
propositions are an early example of the now common approach of looking for
sufficient statistics that describe distributions of outcomes implied by models
as opposed to a full catalog. On average, a country’s trade vector will export
goods that in autarky would be relatively cheap and import goods that in
autarky would be relatively expensive. “On average” is defined as an easily
interpreted covariance or correlation. On average, the factor content of a
country’s trade vector will export factors that in autarky would be relatively
cheap and import factors that in autarky would be relatively expensive. Here
the logic required “on average” to mean a covariance among 3 variables that
Alan termed a “comvariance”. His beautiful spare expressions contained
enough real world complexity so that the theory could actually be tested.
The work of Bernhofen and Brown (2004, 2009) shows that both the general
theory of comparative advantage of 1980 and the factor proportions theory
of 1982 are confirmed by the data.
On re-reading Alan’s papers I was struck again by how general they are,
and how much they look toward confirmation. In particular, I want to men-
tion his treatment of costly trade in the 1980 paper and his treatment of the
factor content of trade in the 1982 paper.
I have recently struggled with integrating trade costs with general equi-
librium myself, so especially I appreciate his clean and very general model
of resource costs of trade. The key insight is to model equilibrium working
backward from delivered products through the technology of distribution and
production. I suspect there may be clues in Alan’s 1980 paper for going be-
yond iceberg trade costs and yet still getting something like gravity to work
with.
As to factor content, Alan’s concern for measurement led him to analyze
the consequences of what looked like several reasonable ways of defining
factor content when techniques differ internationally. His discussion clarified
what would be needed in a world without factor price equalization and paved
the way for Bernhofen and Brown’s 2009 paper.
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We are here to praise Alan Deardorff—hopefully not yet to bury him. This is a
delightful task (the praise, I mean), and not just because of his accomplishments,
which I’ll get to in a minute, but because Alan is one of the truly kind and decent
people in our profession, and I feel privileged to have known him over these many
years.
I am charged to address Alan’s contributions to comparative advantage. This accounts
for a considerable share of his total contribution.
Comparative-advantage trade is trade to exploit international differences, whether
differences in tastes, technology, or factor endowments, or whether differences due to
national economic policies. More formally, a Comparative-Advantage World is
defined by the twin assumptions of perfect competition in all markets and no
externalities.
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The principle of comparative advantage describes the consequences of international
trade in the Classical Setting where international factor markets do not exist. There
are two aspects: the normative and the positive.
The normative component is the gains-from-trade theorem: If international trade
replaces autarky, gainers gain more than losers lose. In each country and therefore in
the world as a whole. This result is a direct reflection of the basic nature of a
Comparative-Advantage World and, as such, remarkably free of other qualification.
The positive component offers predictions of the pattern of trade and of the effect of
trade, for each country, on relative prices and on the pattern of production. But, in
contrast to the normative component, these predictions are quite sensitive to model
detail: the number of goods, especially.
The principle of comparative advantage was derived as a response to basic concerns
of economic policy. Its derivation was critical to the development of international
trade theory and to classical economics more generally, and it remains the preeminent
accomplishment of the theory of international trade. 
For trade theorists, it’s been all downhill ever since.
Alan’s contributions to comparative-advantage theory have been numerous and wide-
ranging. These contributions were without doubt separately conceived, but, with the
aid of hindsight, one can see that a remarkably coherent and wide-ranging research
program was nevertheless accomplished.
First, nearly all of Alan’s research—not just that directed explicitly at comparative
advantage— has been conducted entirely in the framework of a comparative-
advantage world. Second, his work on comparative-advantage trade theory has
concentrated predominantly on the positive aspect of comparative advantage, not the
normative. Third, that work has been successful in addressing the limitations of the
positive approach in an impressively comprehensive way. Fourth, the whole effort
has been characterized by an informed perseverance and clarity of vision consistent
with a very large, deliberate, comprehensive, and early-conceived research program.
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A fundamental contribution—both seminal in its own right and basic to Alan’s larger
accomplishment—was Alan’s explication [14] of the general validity of the positive
predictions of comparative advantage in higher dimensions. (Similar work was done
contemporaneously and independently by Dixit and Norman [20]). These predictions
had previously been understood and expressed in simple two-good, two-country
models.  This fundamental contribution, which resolved questions that had lingered
since the very inception of comparative-advantage theory, was achieved relatively
early in Alan’s career.
So, for Alan also, it has been all downhill ever since.
Alan was able to generalize each of the positive predictions of traditional
comparative-advantage theory to a correlation among the relevant variables. Each
correlation reduced to the standard textbook result in the 2x2 case. But, as a single
constraint on the relevant set of variables, each correlation had less and less bite as the
dimensionality increased. Thus the sensitivity of the result to dimensionality was
rendered quite clear.
Since these results are basic, they must have wide applicability to trade theory. Alan
has indeed done such application, extending the results to the relation between price
and output changes [13], considering the implications of transport costs [9] and of
services [18], and considering in general the domain of relevance of comparative
advantage ([4] and [7]). Not surprisingly, Alan’s interventions have been especially
effective when, as in [11] and [15], a multiplicity of goods is at center stage.
Comparative-advantage trade can be generated by international differences in tastes,
technology, or relative factor endowments. Alan explores them all, singly and in
combination (e.g., [10] for preferences and [5] for technology), but the beauty is in the
fruitful interplay with distinct and common features of basic trade models, an
interplay for which Alan has always demonstrated an uncanny skill.
Alan utilized his basic correlation approach in deriving a general version [12] of the
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, which describes the pattern of trade in a comparative-
Comparative Advantage Meets Alan Deardorff Page 4
advantage world in which comparative advantage is determined solely by
international differences in relative factor endowments. The Heckscher-Ohlin
approach provides the framework for a wide array of contributions (e.g., [6], [8], [16],
and [19]).
In a series of papers ([1], [2], [3], and [17]) Alan, usually with Paul Courant,
examines the trade, and general performance, of “lumpy” countries. These are
countries that trade with the rest of the world and that may impose country-wide trade
barriers, that are composed of distinct regions with limited interregional factor
mobility (and thus regional disparities in factor endowments).
This is much in the spirit of Ohlin’s [21] notion of interregional economic relations. It
contrasts with, but is a very natural complement to, the “new” economic geography
(which differs most notably from the “old” in its choice of heroes). The latter
endogenizes regional disparities, whereas the lumpy-trade models analyze the relation
of such disparities to international trade. While Alan deliberately remains in a
comparative-advantage world, the economic geography literature consciously does
not.
The theory of comparative advantage is central to trade theory and, indeed, is its
crowning achievement. Alan has been outstanding in doing it justice. Sometimes nice
guys do indeed finish first.
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     A basic question asked of any model dealing with a country engaged in international 
trade is “what does this country produce?”  This is a question that must be raised even if 
there is a specified list of what commodities the country consumes and what commodities 
it is technologically capable of producing.  The reason is that international trade allows a 
country’s production pattern to be even more specialized than its consumption pattern 
and, in special cases, for this degree of specialization to reach the extreme limit in which 
only one commodity is produced, with this commodity exported in exchange for a myriad 
of imported commodities that are consumed.  At the other end of possible scenarios is 
one in which, with a given number of inputs available at home, the number of 
commodities that a country produces in a competitive, free-trade equilibrium setting need 
not exceed the count of its productive factors.  For example, in a labor-only Ricardian 
model a trading economy facing given world prices (given independently of its own 
technology and tastes) need only produce and export a single commodity in which it has 
its greatest comparative advantage (relative to the given world commodity prices), and 
will import the rest of its consumption bundle from its export proceeds.  In the simple 
2x2 form of the Heckscher-Ohlin scenario with, say, capital and labor the only two 
factors of production, the country may be specialized to producing a single commodity, 
or may be required to produce a mixture of both commodities in order to achieve full 
employment of both its productive factors.  In this latter case there will typically exist an 
entire range of possible factor endowments for which both these same commodities will 
be produced in a trading equilibrium.  Such a range is referred to as the cone of 
diversification.1   
 
The Two-Commodity Case 
     Figure 1 illustrates such a cone for a two-commodity case in which the two curves 
depend both upon the country’s best technology for producing commodities 1 and 2 and 
upon world prices (and let the dollar be the unit of account), so that these curves 
represent the pair of unit-value isoquants.   The inner convex hull of this pair, including 
the tangent cord ENF, is often referred to as the Hicksian composite unit-value isoquant, 
or the array of best ways of earning a dollar by producing on world markets for given 
world prices.  The actual production choice depends, of course, on the country’s 
endowment bundle of capital and labor.  If the endowment ray lies in the cone determined 
by the tangency points E and F, the factor price ratio, w/r, will be given by the absolute 
value of the slope of the tangent cord.  Should the endowment ray lie outside the cone, 
the country will be completely specialized to producing a single commodity, say 
commodity 2 for a country with a high capital/labor endowment ratio, and the factor price 
ratio will be indicated by the slope of the isoquant.  To see the importance and relevance 
of the tangent cord, ENF, consider an endowment ray that passes through point M.  
Producing just commodity 2 at point M would yield a dollar in world markets, and there 
is no other way in which a single commodity, whether the second commodity or, indeed, 
the first commodity, could, by itself, result in a dollar earned with a smaller bundle of 
                                                 
1 For an early use of this phrase see the magisterial survey of international trade theory by John Chipman, 
Econometrica (1965, 1966), especially Part 3.  The concept of a cone of diversification has frequently been 
used to good effect by Alan Deardorff, most recently in his article (2009) on the diagram made famous by 
Abba Lerner (1952) (after originally appearing as a student paper in 1933 at the London School of 
Economics). 
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labor and capital.  However, producing along the tangent cord, say at point N, would also 
yield a dollar in world markets, and this entails producing both commodities, with, say, 
about 40 cents worth of the first commodity using the techniques at F, as well as 60 cents 
worth of the second commodity using the techniques at point E.  The cone of 
diversification is the array of factor endowment ratios which would lead a country to 
produce along the EF flat. 
     An alternative way of illustrating a cone of diversification is shown in the right-hand 
quadrant of Figure 2.  The pair of upward-sloping curves shows that techniques chosen to 
produce either commodity (that is, the ratio of capital to labor selected) depend upon the 
market value of wages to rents on capital, and more capital-intensive techniques will be 
selected the higher is the wage/rent ratio.  The left-hand diagram illustrates the 
connection between the relative commodity price, p1/p2, and the wage-rent ratio, w/r, if 
the country’s endowment proportions were to allow diversified production.  Note that the 
sign of the slope of the locus reflects the assumption made in the right-hand diagram that 
commodity 2 is the relatively capital-intensive commodity.  A further often-assumed 
property of technology is exhibited in the left-hand diagram:  A ray from the origin 
always cuts the locus so that the ray is flatter than the locus at such a point.  That is, an 
increase in the relative price of the first commodity would, if both commodities can be 
produced, result in a greater than proportionate increase in the ratio of wages to rents.  
This must be the case if, as is usually assumed, there is no joint production:  Each 
commodity is produced separately by using inputs of capital and labor.2   
                                                 
2 As discussed in Jones (1965), there is a magnification effect whereby relative changes in each commodity 
price are flanked by the relative change in each factor price.  Letting    represent  dx/x, if commodity 1’s 
relative price increases,   
x̂
.ˆˆˆˆ 21 rppw >>>
 3
     Suppose that the commodity price ratio is fixed at 0G on the left-hand side of Figure 
2.  If both commodities are produced the ratio of wages to rents must be shown by 0H, 
and the flat in the right-hand side displays the array of possible endowment rays, IJ, in 
which the economy can produce both commodities in a competitive equilibrium.  These 
endowments are those shown in the cone of diversification shown in Figure 1.   
     Figure 2 can be used to illustrate two possible scenarios.  First, suppose the relative 
price of the first commodity should increase.  Clearly there would emerge a different, 
higher, flat in the right-hand diagram.  This can also be illustrated in Figure 1 by shifting 
the unit-value isoquant for the first commodity radially towards the origin.3  This would 
serve to rotate the cone of diversification counter-clockwise, with a corresponding steeper 
tangent cord (and an increase in w/r).   
     Secondly, keep the commodity price ratio unchanged (at 0G) and consider the changes 
in production patterns (and wage/rent ratios) either for an economy growing to ever 
higher capital/labor endowment proportions or for a comparison of the original economy 
(with an endowment ratio in the cone of diversification) with another economy that 
shares the same technology but has different factor endowments.  In the first 
interpretation note that if the economy is very labor abundant, it would be completely 
specialized to the first commodity and, as its relative capital endowment increases, so 
does its relative wage rate until it enters the cone of diversification.  In the cone, until 
extreme point J is reached, the economy’s relative wage rate stays constant despite its 
growth in K/L.  Although this rules out any accommodation in techniques or factor prices 
at the intensive margin, such growth will be accommodated by changes in the extensive 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
3 For simplicity I assume that p1 increases for a given value of p2. 
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margin – the change in the composition of outputs 1 and 2, with both capital and labor 
being released from production in the labor-intensive first commodity towards capital-
intensive commodity 2.4  Further growth in the capital/labor endowment proportions will 
eventually lead to the economy becoming completely specialized in producing the 
capital-intensive commodity.   The second interpretation introduces a second country, 
sharing the same technology.  Again suppose with trade that the equilibrium price ratio 
settles at the 0G level in the left-hand part of Figure 2, and the home country’s 
endowment ray is in the cone of diversification.  Will free trade result in the same factor 
price ratio in the two countries?  To some this seemed unlikely since the assumption is 
being made that factors of production are not mobile internationally.  However, such 
equality would indeed take place if the foreign country’s endowment ratio were not too 
different from that at home, i.e. if it also lay within the cone of diversification.5  If the 
foreign country’s endowment ratio lies even further from that at home, factor price 
equalization cannot take place. 
 
Factor Intensity Reversal in Technology 
     With this simple case in mind, turn now to a different possible outcome, one that was 
discussed after Leontief (1953) cast doubt on Heckscher-Ohlin predictions by suggesting 
that American exports were more labor-intensive than American import-competing 
commodities.  It was subsequently argued (e.g. Jones (1956)) that even if countries 
                                                 
4 In Jones (2004) I showed how this was relevant to development in open economies, where even smooth 
aggregate growth can be hiding strong churning activity between sectors as resources are reallocated at the 
micro-level. 
5 The possibility of factor-price equalization was shown in Samuelson (1948), but the general surprise 
shown in the profession led him to restate the argument the next year (1949) in the same journal. 
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shared the same technology and were both producing the same pair of commodities in a 
cone of diversification, the technology could allow more than one such cone to exist. 
Figure 3 illustrates this possibility.  The technology for producing commodity 2 is 
assumed to be less flexible than that for the first commodity so that when labor is 
relatively inexpensive the first commodity is labor intensive (just as in Figure 2), but at 
much higher relative wage rates the more flexible technology for producing the first 
commodity results in its becoming more capital intensive than the second commodity.6 
There are two cones of diversification. The more labor-abundant home country might be 
incompletely specialized in cone A while the foreign country might also be incompletely 
specialized, but in cone B.  If so, obviously these two countries, which both share a 
common set of production functions, would not have their factor prices equalized by free 
trade.  As for the Leontief paradox, it is now a logical impossibility that for this pair of 
countries each is exporting the commodity that is more intensive in its relatively 
abundant factor than is its import-competing commodity.  Why?  Either both countries 
export the commodity that is capital-intensive in its country, or each exports the 
commodity that is labor-intensive in its country (Jones, 1956).   
     Figure 4’s right-hand panel illustrates this phenomenon of factor intensity reversal.  
The two positively sloped curves are assumed to intersect each other (and there could be 
more than one intersection point), a reflection only of the comparison in technologies for 
the two commodities.7  The relevant ranges of points along this pair of curves depend 
                                                 
6 Nonetheless, for an economy with a given endowment the commodity that is labor intensive at some level 
of outputs must remain so for all possible outputs.  That is, for constant returns to scale technology, the 
contract curve in a production box diagram either lies everywhere above the diagonal of the box, below it, 
or must itself be the diagonal.   
7 It is interesting to note that in subsequent decades much reliance was placed on a particular form for 
production functions:  that of a constant elasticity of substitution (the CES function).  When such functions 
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upon the value of the commodity price ratio, especially since each commodity-price ratio 
may support more than one factor-price ratio.  The locus relating these two ratios is 
shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 4, and is non-monotonic.  Commodity price ratio 
0G is supportive of two flats in the right-hand panel (or two cones of diversification in 
Figure 3).  The lower of the two factor-price ratios supports the flat A in Figure 4, and if 
two countries have endowment ratios on this flat, their factor prices would be equal.  If 
commodity 1 should become a bit more expensive, flat A would be shifted upwards, 
commensurate with the first commodity being labor intensive in this region.  Along the 
upper flat (B) an increase in the relative price of the first commodity would lower the 
relative wage rate.  Whereas factor-price equality would prevail if both countries have 
endowments placing them on flat B, this would not be the case if the home country is 
relatively labor abundant along flat A and the foreign country has its endowment ratio 
anywhere else.  If this is in flat B, a commonly-faced increase in commodity 1’s relative 
market price would lower the foreign country’s relative wage rate while wages would 
increase, relatively, in the home country.  They share a common technology and face a 
common change in commodity prices and yet have factor prices moving in opposite 
directions.8   
     Finally, consider the case in which the home country starts off by being very labor- 
abundant, producing nothing but the first, labor-intensive, commodity.  Assuming the 
commodity-price ratio stays the same when the home country experiences growth in its 
                                                                                                                                                 
have different elasticities, the kind of factor intensity reversal phenomenon discussed here becomes 
ubiquitous.  
8 Note that the factor-price ratios in the two countries move together in the case in which the price rise is 
for the commodity that is more flexible in its technology.  If, instead, there is a relative price rise for the 
commodity that has a less flexible technology, the factor-price discrepancy is enhanced. 
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capital/labor endowment ratio, this country would experience the following changes in its 
production:  Eventually it reaches flat A so that resources are gradually shifted out of 
producing labor-intensive commodity 1 towards the second commodity.  When it 
becomes completely specialized to the second commodity and continues its capital 
growth, it remains specialized to commodity 2 until flat B is reached (i.e. in Figure 3 
when the endowment ray, moving in a counter-clockwise manner, enters cone-of-
diversification B) until further capital accumulation encourages it again to specialize in its 
capital-intensive commodity, which now is the first commodity.  Thus in this two-
commodity case in which there is a technological factor-intensity reversal, steady growth 
in a country’s capital/labor endowment proportions can witness a stage when it is 
transferring resources from commodity 1 to commodity 2 and, following a period of 
complete specialization, once again produces both commodities but now switches 
resources back to the first commodity. 
 
Cones in the Multi-Commodity Setting 
     The discussion of cones of diversification can be extended to the case in which many 
commodities can be produced and many countries engage in trade.  However, a 
diagrammatic treatment is much easier to pursue while limiting the number of factors of 
production to two, labor and capital.  Figure 5 displays a five-commodity case for a given 
technology and, as well, a given set of commodity prices.  Clearly this combination rules 
out production of commodity 5 for any country with this technology.  Any of 
commodities 1 – 4 could be produced competitively by an economy with this technology 
if its factor endowments were appropriate.  Given capital and labor as the only productive 
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inputs, a country engaged in free trade at the given prices could concentrate on producing 
only a single commodity or a pair of commodities if its endowment ray should lie within 
cones A, B, or C. 
     Figure 6 displays this information in a different fashion.9  With commodity prices 
given and fixed, production patterns depend upon factor endowments (as in Figure 5), 
and the heavy locus charts out the path that would be taken if prices remain constant but 
the country is growing from low to high levels of capital per unit of labor.  Note that I 
have assumed that there are no technological factor intensity reversals, such as shown in 
Figure 4.  Steady growth leads to a production response that starts at an extremely labor-
abundant stage calling for complete specialization in the most labor-intensive 
commodity, 1, followed by diversified production in flat A during which growth favors 
production of the second commodity, aided by a reallocation of resources used to produce 
the first commodity.  Note that production along every different flat is flanked by ranges 
in which only a single commodity is produced.10   
     As discussed earlier, such a diagram is also useful in comparing the activities 
undertaken, and relative factor prices established, in two economies that, although 
sharing the same technology and facing the same prices for commodities found on world 
markets, have different factor endowment bundles.  Are their factor prices equalized in 
the global market?  Yes, if endowments happen to be located in the same cone of 
diversification, producing the same pair of commodities, which presupposes that their 
endowment ratios are fairly similar.  Otherwise the more capital abundant region will, 
perhaps not surprisingly, have higher wage rates relative to the returns to capital, with a 
                                                 
9 An early use of this kind of diagram for the multi-commodity case is found in Jones (1974). 
10 An exception has to be made for the case in which isoquants are right-angled, so that there is only a 
single way of producing a commodity regardless of changes in the wage/rental ratio. 
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different pattern of production.  In the spirit of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem, it must 
then be the case that all capital/labor ratios found in production in the more capital-
abundant country must exceed any found in the labor-abundant country.  In particular this 
must imply that the capital-abundant country’s exportable is produced by capital-
intensive techniques compared to those utilized in producing exportables in a more labor-
abundant country.11 However, this was not the test used by Leontief (1953) in his 
examination of American input-output data.  Instead, the Leontief procedure involves 
comparing factor intensities used in American exports with those in American import-
competing production.  If, as he found, American import-competing products were more 
capital intensive than those utilized in the export sectors, would that necessarily imply 
that America was the more labor-abundant country?  Figure 6 shows how, in a multi-
commodity setting, such a conclusion is not warranted.  Let Home be the capital-
abundant country, with factor endowment proportions shown by point I on Flat C, while 
Foreign, the more labor abundant country, produces at point J on Flat A.  These two 
production points suggest that Home devotes most of its resources to produce commodity 
3, for export as well as local consumption, and will be importing commodity 4 (as well as 
commodities 1, 2, and 5 since it does not produce any of them).  Labor-abundant Foreign 
has an opposite kind of trading pattern – exporting its capital-intensive good, 2, and 
importing, inter alia, its import-competing commodity produced, commodity 1.  The 
Leontief type of procedure, inferring a factor abundance ranking by comparing (for each 
country) the ranking between the use of capital and labor in that country’s exportable 
                                                 
11 And this is the case whether or not these two countries trade with each other in a multi-country world, as 
long as they share a common technology and face the same set of world market prices. 
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production with the ranking used in import-competing production, would judge Home to 
be the labor-abundant country! 12    
     In discussing the case in which there is a technological reversal of the factor intensity 
ranking in Figure 4, I pointed out that an increase in the relative price of the first 
commodity would serve to raise relative wage rates in a country whose endowment ray 
lay in flat A, while lowering relative wages in a country sharing the same technology but 
possessing a capital/labor endowment proportion in flat B.  In the current case there are 
no technological reversals, but much the same result occurs if in two countries factor 
endowment proportions result not in their sharing a common flat, but rather in having 
proportions relatively close so that they do share in the production of a common 
commodity, but also with each producing a separate commodity that is not produced in 
the other.  This is illustrated in Figure 6 by endowment points J and M.  A decrease in the  
price of the second commodity would serve to raise the relative wage rate in the labor- 
abundant country and lower it in the more capital abundant country, much as in Figure 
4’s illustration of a technological reversal of factor intensities in the two-commodity case 
even though there are no technological reversals in Figure 6’s many-commodity 
illustration.  
     Another query that may be raised also concerns the effect of an increase in the price of 
one of the traded commodities, say commodity 3 in Figure 6.  Although not shown, such 
a price increase would serve to raise the flat in cone C and lower it in cone B.  Does such 
a price change encourage countries to specialize in production even further?  The answer 
is typical:  it depends.  For a country at point I, originally producing commodities 3 and 
4, a sufficient increase in p3 would serve to induce the country to specialize completely in 
                                                 
12 This argument is developed in more detail in Jones (2008). 
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the third commodity, abandoning its production of the fourth commodity.  By contrast, an 
economy with factor endowments that initially serve to promote specialization in the 
second commodity may, if the rise in p3 is large enough, end up in cone B, becoming less 
specialized by producing both commodities 2 and 3.  It all depends.   
 
Concluding Remarks:  The Significance of Cones of Diversification 
     A question that can be raised in any general equilibrium model depicting international 
trade is how a country can absorb a change in its relative factor endowments (say growth 
in the labor force with no change in the capital endowment) if all commodity prices are 
determined in a larger world market.  In principle there are two ways: (i) through a 
change at the intensive margin, i.e. through an increase in the amount of labor used per 
unit of capital throughout the economy, and (ii) through a change at the extensive margin, 
i.e. in the quantities of commodities produced.  For example consider a simple version of 
the specific-factors model (e.g. Jones, 1971) in which each of two sectors employs a type 
of capital utilized only in that sector along with labor drawn from a common pool 
available to both sectors.  If, say, the labor supply expands, the wage rate must fall, 
serving to raise the return to capital in both sectors (remember that commodity prices are 
determined on world markets).  At the intensive margin new labor is absorbed in part by 
the use of more labor-intensive techniques in both sectors.  At the extensive margin 
outputs in both sectors increase, perhaps not in the same proportion.13  However, in 
different model settings where the number of commodities produced is as large as the 
number of productive factors, such as in the 2x2 model illustrated in Figures 1-4 in the 
                                                 
13 Output in the first sector increases relatively more if the first sector is more labor intensive and/or has 
more flexible technology. 
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cones of diversification, adjustment to endowment changes at given commodity prices is 
achieved by changes only at the extensive margin .  No changes in factor prices (and in 
the intensive margin) are required.  This is the basis for the factor-price equalization 
theorem.  With commodity diversification within cones, sufficient to provide the same 
number of competitive profit conditions (zero profits in equilibrium) as there are inputs, 
factor prices are completely determined by commodity prices.14 
     Finally, this discussion of the characteristics of the cones of diversification, even in 
the case of factor-intensity reversals of a technological kind or in the multi-commodity 
case, reveals the richness of Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory.  Although the outcome in 
which factor-price equalization for two countries sharing the same cone takes place at 
constant commodity prices, with both countries experiencing the same effect on factor 
prices if commodity prices change, is standard fare in Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, 
these results are no longer the only possibilities for the Heckscher-Ohlin model.   
     A cone of diversification entails a trading economy producing as many commodities 
as there are productive factors in an economy.  This is not possible if the number of 
factors exceeds the number of commodities (as in specific-factors models), in which case 
any alteration in factor endowments at given commodity prices must result in changes 
both in the intensive and extensive margins and factor prices must change in order to 
accommodate changes in factor proportions.  However, if the number of commodities an 
economy is technologically capable of producing is at least as large as the number of its 
productive factors, one or more cones of diversification exist for each set of commodity 
prices.  Alterations in factor endowments within these cones can be accommodated 
without making use of changes in factor prices and techniques of production, and this is a 
                                                 
14 Perhaps not uniquely, as Figure 4 illustrates. 
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phenomenon not shared by any set of factor endowments outside these cones.  
Heckscher-Ohlin theory is rich in its possibilities for income distribution as endowments 
and commodity prices change, with the consequences for income distribution depending 
critically on whether or not the economy’s factor endowments lie within a cone of 


















Chipman, John (1966):  “A Survey of the Theory of International Trade:  Part 3, The  
     Modern Theory,” Econometrica, , pp. 18-76. 
Deardorff, Alan (2009):  “The Lerner Diagram,” forthcoming in M. Blaug and P. Lloyd  
     (eds.), Famous Figures and Diagrams, forthcoming, Edward Elgar. 
Jones, Ronald W. (1956):  “Factor Proportions and the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem,” 
     Review of Economic Studies, v. 24, pp. 1-10. 
______________ (1965):  “The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models,” 
     Journal of Political Economy, v. 73, pp. 557-72. 
______________ (1971):  “A Three Factor Model in theory, Trade and History,”, Ch. 1  
     in Bhagwati, Jones, Mundell and Vanek (eds.): Trade, Balance of Payments and  
     Growth (North-Holland, Amsterdam). 
______________ (1974):  “The Small Country in a Many Commodity World,”  
     Australian Economic Papers, v. 13, pp. 225-36. 
______________ (2004):  “Micro-Churning with Smooth Macro Growth:  Two  
     Examples,” Ch. 8 in S.Dowrick, R. Pitchford, and S. Turnovsky (eds.): Economic  
     Growth and Macroeconomic Dynamics:  Recent Developments in Economic Theory, 
     (Cambridge University Press). 
______________ (2008):  “Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Flows:  A Re-appraisal,” Trade and  
     Development Review v. 1, #1, pp. 1-6. 
Leontief, Wassily (1953):  “Domestic Production and Foreign Trade:  The American  
     Capital Position Re-examined,”  Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 
     97, 4. 
 15
 
Lerner, Abba (1952):  “Factor Prices and International Trade,” Economica n.s. 19,  
     pp. 1-15.   
Samuelson, Paul A. (1948):  “International Trade and the Equalisation of Factor Prices,” 
     Economic Journal, v. 58, pp. 163-84. 
________________ (1949):  “International Factor-Price Equalisation Once Again,” 





































































1. The old new trade story 
 
       I like to begin classes on international trade by telling students that there are two basic 
explanations of international trade. The first is comparative advantage, which says that countries 
trade to take advantage of their differences – a concept that lay at the heart of Alan Deardorff’s 
beautiful, classic paper “The general validity of the law of comparative advantage” (1980). The 
second is increasing returns, which says that countries trade to take advantage of the inherent 
advantages of specialization, which allows large-scale production – which is what the “new trade 
theory” was all about.  
     I also like to illustrate these concepts from everyday experience. Everyday illustrations of 
comparative advantage are, of course, a staple of introductory textbooks – why sports stars 
shouldn’t mow their own lawns, etc. But it’s equally easy to illustrate the role of increasing 
returns. Even if two people are equally suited for the roles of rocket scientist and brain surgeon, 
it makes sense for one to specialize on surgery and the other on rockets, because mastering either 
skill takes years of study, and it would be wasteful for both people to master both disciplines. 
     So far, so good. But I have also usually tied this potted explanation of what trade theory is all 
about to a potted version of world economic history as a play in three acts: the fall and rise of 
comparative advantage. Act I goes as follows: before World War I there was a high level of 
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world trade, and this trade fitted the comparative advantage paradigm pretty well; it was mainly 
between very different countries exporting very different goods. British trade, in particular, was 
mainly a matter of exporting manufactured goods and importing raw materials, and as a result 
most of the trade was with primary-product exporters that either had much higher land-labor 
ratios or were at a much lower level of economic development. 
     This first global economy was largely dismantled by wars and protectionism. Act II focuses 
on the recovery of trade after World War II, which took a very different form. Much of the 
growth of trade was the result of liberalization agreements among advanced countries, so that 
trade between similar countries came to dominate overall flows. And much of this trade between 
similar countries was also trade in similar goods – intraindustry trade – driven mainly by 
specialization due to increasing returns, a point noticed early on by Balassa (1966). The new 
trade theory – or, as my students tend to call it, the old new trade theory – began by using models 
of monopolistic competition to make sense of this similar-similar trade, essentially formalizing 
the Balassa’s original story. 
    Finally, in Act III comparative advantage staged a comeback. Trade liberalization in 
developing countries led to a sharp rise in North-South trade, which meant that once again much 
of world trade was taking place between very different countries. Unlike in the pre-WWI era, 
however, developing countries weren’t mainly exporting primary products. Instead, they were 
exporting labor-intensive manufactures. This trade was able to grow so much in part because 
reductions in transport cost made it possible to fragment production into labor-intensive and 
skill-intensive stages (the subject of another line of Alan Deardorff’s work, e.g. Deardorff 
(2001). So trade in today’s world, like trade before World War II, is largely driven by 
comparative advantage, in which countries trade to take advantage of their differences. 
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     As I said, this is the story I and many others have been telling for some time. And it’s right in 
many respects. I now believe, however, that it misses an important point: the key role played by 
increasing returns, mainly in the form of localized external economies, even in times when the 
broad pattern of trade reflects comparative advantage. These localized externalities played a 
large role in the world economy of the early 20th century – and they play, if anything, an even 
larger role today. 
 
2. Collars and cuffs, buttons and cigarette lighters 
 
      The rise of the “new economic geography” and the increasing use of gravity-type 
relationships for empirical trade analysis (e.g. Deardorff 199x and Eaton and Kortum 2001) have 
put space and distance into the mainstream of international economics. Yet we still tend, much 
more often than not, to model countries as dimensionless points. That’s a strategic simplification 
that makes a great deal of sense for many purposes. But I have recently convinced myself that 
it’s a habit that leads us to miss much of what was really going on in Acts I and III of the story 
described above. 
       Let’s start by talking about the geography of industrial economies in the late 19th and early 
20th century. 
       Many writers on economic geography have found inspiration in Chapter 10 of Alfred 
Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1880), on “the concentration of specialized industries in 
particular localities.” Marshall mentioned such examples as the Sheffield cutlery industry and the 
Staffordshire pottery industry, but there were many other examples that would have been 
familiar to his readers: the Nottingham lace industry, the Dundee jute industry, and so on. 
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      On the other side of the Atlantic, the twelfth (1900) census included a quantitative 
assessment of industry localization (Hall 1902), which demonstrated the extraordinary degree to 
which some industries were geographically concentrated: detachable collars and cuffs in Troy, 
NY, underwear in Cohoes NY, costume jewelry in and around Providence, silk in Paterson NJ, 
and more.  
     Some of these localized industries owed their origin to specific advantages of the site, but 
many were the result of historical accident – the blacksmith’s wife who supposedly invented the 
detachable collar in Troy, the local entrepreneur named Egbert Egberts who installed the world’s 
first power knitting machine in Cohoes. And regardless of origins, each localization was 
sustained by the trinity of agglomeration effects described by Marshall: information spillovers 
(“The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air”), specialized 
suppliers, and thick labor markets. In short, external economies of scale. 
      And here’s the thing: at least in the case of Britain, many of these localized industries were 
export-oriented, selling much of their production overseas. Dundee, for example, dominated 
global jute manufacturing – and since burlap bags were in demand everywhere, it was largely an 
export-oriented cluster. 
     Notice that I’m not asserting that increasing returns in the form of localized external 
economies actually caused international trade. It was probably the case that in the mid-19th-
century world economy only Britain had the right combination of resources, skills, and general 
technological competence to export many of the manufactured goods it did, in fact, export. In 
other words, comparative advantage determined the pattern of trade. Nonetheless, increasing 
returns were clearly evident in the local geography of production. And as I’ll argue shortly, this 
has important implications for how we think about the gains from trade. 
5 
 
      Before I get there, however, let me fast forward to today’s world – a world in which 
comparative advantage once again determines much of the pattern of trade. Thus, China’s 
dominant role in the export of many labor-intensive manufactured goods surely reflects its 
combination of relatively abundant labor and relatively high manufacturing competence. There’s 
not much historical accident in the fact that China makes the bulk of the world’s buttons. 
       But there probably is a lot of historical accident and cumulative causation in the fact that 60 
percent of the world’s buttons are manufactured in the small town of Qiaotou, where, the story 
goes, three decades ago three brothers saw some discarded buttons lying in the gutter, realized 
there was a money-making opportunity, and planted the seed of an industrial cluster. And 
Qiaotou is characteristic of China’s industrial landscape. As was the case for industrial Britain in 
the 19th century, many of China’s manufactured exports are produced by highly localized 
industries whose geographical concentration shows clear evidence of the importance of external 
economies. Wenzhou produces 95 percent of the world’s cigarette lighters; Yanbu is the 
underwear capital (the Cohoes of the 21st century!); and on and on.  
      Again, industrial localization within China probably has little if any impact on the pattern of 
trade measured at a national level, which basically reflects comparative advantage. But this does 
not, it turns out, mean that a pure comparative advantage approach tells the whole story. In 
particular, the story we should be telling about the gains from trade requires that we take account 
of the effects of external economies, even if these external economies don’t affect the overall 
pattern of trade. 
      Actually, this should be obvious (but wasn’t, at least to me, until I wrote this paper) from the 
everyday examples we use to illustrate the roots of trade. Suppose that Harry and Louise have to 
choose between rocket science and brain surgery – and that Louise has a clear advantage in the 
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surgery department (Harry faints at the sight of blood). In that case, their pattern of specialization 
is fully determined by comparative advantage: Harry does rockets, Louise does brains. Yet the 
gains from trade are to a large extent the result not of the differences between the two 
individuals, but of the inherent advantages of specialization: because Harry can launch Louise 
while Louise fixes his brain, each of the two only needs to master one skill. 
      So how do we model this result – trade patterns determined by comparative advantage, but 
trade gains nonetheless including a strong element of increasing returns – more formally? 
 
3. Localized external economies and the gains from trade 
 
     When one tries to model the role of localized external economies in international trade, it 
turns out that the key strategic decisions involve what one assumes about factor prices. Within 
countries, should one assume that factors are perfectly mobile, and therefore equalize across 
industries, or should one think in terms of “lumpy” countries (Courant and Deardorff 1992) 
across which wages and other factor prices differ? If factor prices are uniform within countries, 
what happens between countries? Should we assume that trade leads to factor price equalization, 
or should we model a world in which factor prices are unequal and in which countries that are 
lucky enough to get a disproportionate share of increasing-returns industries have higher wages? 
     In reality, there’s a strong case for arguing that the lumpy-country representation is more 
realistic than the assumption of perfect internal mobility. China is famously still very much a 
dual economy, with an industrial coast and a still-backward interior. In fact, China still has legal 
restrictions on internal migration, even if these are largely ignored. 
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      And with Chinese hourly compensation in manufacturing still only a tiny fraction of Western 
levels (Lett and Banister 2009), it’s obvious that factor-price equalization does not prevail 
internationally. 
    But this paper is an exploratory effort, which means that simplicity is of the essence. So I’m 
going to do violence to reality and assume both that factors of production move freely to equalize 
factor prices within countries and that trade leads to factor price equalization internationally. 
(One can, if one likes, make a partial excuse by assuming that factors are measured in efficiency 
units, with the productivity of labor in particular varying across countries). The meaning of the 
first assumption is obvious; the second will take a little explaining. 
    So let’s bring on Samuelson’s angel. 
    In 1949 Paul Samuelson sought to explain the fundamental logic of factor-price equalization 
with a parable inspired by the story of the Tower of Babel (Samuelson 1949). He asked readers 
to envision an original state of the world with no impediments to mobility of productive factors, 
so that all factor prices would be equalized. Then, he suggested, an angel came down to smite 
each unit of each factor on the forehead – that is, to divide labor, capital, and so on among 
nations, with the new rule that factors from each country could only work with other factors from 
the same country. 
      The question then becomes, how much damage did the angel do? And the answer is that if 
factors are not too unevenly divided among nations, none at all. For trade can, under certain 
circumstances, allow the world to produce the same quantity of each good, using the same factor 
inputs, as it would have if the angel had never made his visitation.  
      The basic logic is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows a three-good world economy.  I’ll 
initially assume constant returns. There are assumed to be two factors of production, capital and 
8 
 
labor, with the sides of the box representing the total world supply of each factor. There are three 
goods, A, B, and C. The vectors labeled A, B, C represent the factors that would have been 
employed in the production of each good in the integrated, pre-angel economy. 
      Now the angel does his smiting. This divides the world’s productive resources between two 
countries, Home and Foreign. In Figure 2, the sides of the box continue to represent total world 
resources; resources belonging to Home are measured from the southwest corner, resources 
belonging to Foreign from the northeast corner, so that the division of resources can be 
represented by the endowment point E.  
      Does this division do any damage? Not as drawn. In a constant-returns world, as long as the 
endowment point lies within the irregular hexagon shown it is possible to allocate world 
production between Home and Foreign in such a way as to reproduce the integrated economy – 
producing the same quantities of each good, using the same factor inputs, as would have 
happened if there had been no avenging angel. In such a world equilibrium factor prices will be 
equalized. It’s also straightforward to show that the pattern of trade will reflect factor 
abundances – specifically, if we look at the factor content of trade we will find each country 
exporting the factor in which it is abundant. 
     Now, how does this change if we introduce localized external economies? In the integrated 
economy, production of each good subject to such localized economies would be concentrated in 
a single location. To reproduce the integrated economy post-angel, this must continue to be true 
– which means that each good subject to localization economies must be concentrated in a single 
country. And this is a case already analyzed in Helpman and Krugman (1985). 
      Figure 3 shows how it works. Assume that good A is subject to localized external economies, 
while B and C remain constant returns. Then to reproduce the integrated economy production of 
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A must be concentrated either in Home or in Foreign, while B and C can be allocated between 
the countries. This in turn implies that the integrated economy can be reproduced as long as the 
endowment point lies within either the upper parallelogram – corresponding to concentration of 
industry A in Home – or within the lower parallelogram, corresponding to concentration of A in 
Foreign. In the figure as drawn, the endowment point lies in the upper but not the lower 
parallelogram, so that the only equilibrium that reproduces the integrated economy is one in 
which Home produces A. (There may be other equilibria that don’t reproduce the integrated 
economy, but I disregard that possibility). 
     The equilibrium portrayed in Figure 3 may not look significantly different from the 
equilibrium shown in Figure 2. In both cases the pattern of specialization and trade is determined 
by resources. In both cases factor prices are equalized, and the factor content of trade reflects 
national factor abundances. So one might be tempted to say that localized external economies 
don’t matter for the story. 
     But that turns out not to be true once we turn to the gains from trade. 
     The standard proof of the gains from trade – the proof that lies behind Deardorff’s generalized 
version of comparative advantage -- is, of course, stated in terms of goods volume and goods 
prices. As Helpman and I pointed out (1985), however, when trade leads to factor price 
equalization it is also possible to think of gains from trade in terms of the dual. This isn’t 
especially useful in most contexts. But it offers a convenient way to think about the role of 
localized external economies. 
     Figure 4 shows the constant returns case. Note that in this case we’re not comparing pre- and 
post-angel situations – we’re back to the more usual comparison between free trade and autarky. 
In this case the curve shows the unit isoquant for some good. The dotted line represents the 
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vector of resources that would have been used to produce the good under autarky. When trade is 
opened, however, factor prices – which are, remember, assumed to become equalized 
internationally – are different from what they would have been under autarky. And what the 
figure shows is that at the new factor prices, the bundle of resources that was used to produce 
one unit of each good in autarky now has a purchasing power that is more than enough to 
purchase that unit in a trading economy. Hence the nation as a whole, which consists of all its 
productive factors, is more than able to afford its pre-trade consumption: gains from trade. 
     So far, nothing new. But now introduce localized external economies. These shift the unit 
isoquant for each good subject to these externalities. The isoquant shifts outward in countries 
that don’t end up producing the good, and therefore lose the external economies they had. But as 
long as factor prices are equalized, the only thing that matters for welfare is how a country’s pre-
trade isoquant compares with the post-trade isoquant in the country that ends up producing the 
good. And it’s a reasonable presumption that this isoquant lies inside every country’s pre-trade 
isoquant, since world production of the good and hence the strength of external economies will 
normally be larger than any individual country’s production would have been in the absence of 
trade.  
     Figure 5 shows the implications. As before, the bundle of factors that would have produced a 
unit of the good in autarky are more than able to buy that unit after trade, showing that trade 
increases national purchasing power. But when goods are subject to localized external 
economies, there are two reasons for that gain. One is that countries are different, which leads to 
a change in factor prices. The other is that the concentration of world production in a single 
location allows greater exploitation of external economies, and hence raises efficiency. There are 
gains from trade due to the specialization of China in labor-intensive industries like button 
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manufacture, but there are further gains from trade – gains that accrue to the world as a whole – 
from the concentration of world button production in the single small town of Qiaotou. 
      Over the past century world trade has gone through a great arc. At the beginning of the 
century trade was primarily between countries with very different resources exporting very 
different goods, so that it seemed to be a comparative advantage world. By the 1980s trade was 
largely between countries with similar resources exporting similar goods, so that economists 
turned to increasing-returns models to make sense of what they saysaw. But today, with the rise 
of China and other low-wage economies, we seem once again to be in a comparative advantage 
world, in which countries with very different resources export very different goods. 
     What I’ve argued in this paper, however, is that even during comparative-advantage eras 
increasing returns in the form of localized external economies plays a significant role. In fact, the 
same eras in which comparative advantage seems to have ruled international trade are also the 
eras in which increasing returns has seemed to exert its strongest influence on intra-national 
economic geography. And this observation isn’t irrelevant even in the trade context: gains from 
localization arguably are a significant source of gains from trade, even if they don’t seem to 
affect the pattern of specialization. 
      Does this have any relevance to current policy disputes? Well, many people – myself 
included – have argued that imports of labor-intensive goods from developing countries exert a 
depressing influence on the real wages of less-skilled workers in advanced countries. This may 
still be true, but the role of local external economies may offer a partial offset: if Chinese buttons 
are cheap not just because of low wages but also because of the advantages of the Qiaotou 
cluster, U.S. imports of buttons have an ambiguous effect on low-skill wages rather than a 
definite Stolper-Samuelson effect. 
12 
 
      I don’t want to push this too far, however. The main point of this paper is simply to point out 
that increasing returns – made apparent by the localization of industries – have historically 
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It is a huge pleasure to contribute to this happy event. I have known Alan Deardorff 
for over thirty years and have enjoyed his company and savored his insights on countless 
occasions. He is not just a great scholar, but also a great guy, an indefatigable champion of 
the field of international trade, and a disinterested provider of public goods. We are all in 
his debt for his web resources, useful as well as fun, that shine like a good deed in a 
naughty world, or, to push the public goods analogy further, like a lighthouse towering 
over shark-infested seas. (I will refrain from naming any sharks.) Of course, we are also in 
his debt for his scholarship, and I want to make some remarks today inspired by rereading 
his classic papers on generalizing the theory of comparative advantage and the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem.2 
I want to concentrate in particular on the generalization of Heckscher-Ohlin, since I 
believe that there is more that can be said about this. Alan derived the key result that the 
value at autarky factor prices of the factor content of trade (which I denote by  w   and  0
M1   respectively) must be positive: 
0. 10 >Mw       (1) 
where  M   is the vector of factors that would be needed to produce domestically the 
imports of goods. So, in a very general competitive framework, factors which are 
expensive in autarky will on average be imported: not directly, but embodied in the goods 
                                                 
2Avinash Dixit and Victor Norman (1980) also deserve credit for their independent work on these 
topics: taken together, the work of these three made a huge advance in explaining what we know 
and what (ex ante) we cannot know about trade patterns in general equilibrium. 
 
 
that are actually imported. However, Alan, and others subsequently, were very uneasy with 
this result. The problem is that we cannot be sure that the net imports of factors as 
measured by the vector  1M   have a zero mean, and so we cannot use (1) to derive a 
correlation between the two vectors. In a sense, the problem is that we have failed to 
address the question expensive relative to what? when we say that factors are expensive in 
autarky.3 Alan's response to this was to seek implications of (1) which do yield correlation-
type results, and he pursued some ingenious routes to deriving them. One of these was to 
consider all countries in the world together. Assuming that (1) holds for each, he showed 
that we can stack the autarky factor prices and net factor imports of all countries to form 
two giant vectors, and the world version of (1) now yields a true correlation since all 
countries overall cannot import factors on average, so the stacked world vector of the  1M   
must have a non-positive mean. 
By contrast, I want to stick with equation (1) and to tease out its implications. One 
reason for this is empirical: we are unlikely ever to be able to observe autarky factor prices 
in all countries of a hypothetical non-trading world, so the stacked result is not going to 
help empirical work, despite its theoretical interest and importance. By contrast, in some 
exceptional cases we can observe autarky factor prices for a single country, which opens 
up the possibility of checking whether (1) holds in practice. This is exactly the approach 
which Daniel Bernhofen and John Brown adopt in an unpublished paper, which extends 
their earlier work on testing comparative advantage. (See Bernhofen and Brown (2004, 
2009).) They have access to an extremely rich data set on Japan for the periods just before 
                                                 
3Note that there is no problem of units of measurement: changing the units in which factors are 
measured can be thought of as pre-multiplying the  M   vector by a diagonal transformation matrix  
. But then the factor prices must also be pre-multiplied by its inverse,  T 1−T , and when we form 
the inner product (1),  T   cancels so the result is unit free. 
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and just after it opened up to trade in the 1860s, and are able to estimate autarky prices for 
a range of factors, as well as the net factor flows embodied in imports after trade. 
Reassuringly, they find that equation (1) holds, as the theory predicts. They also find some 
unexpected implications. For example, when they decompose the inner product to consider 
the contribution of different factors, they find that much of the implied value of embodied 
net imports is accounted for by female labor: pointing towards an unanticipated 
implication of Japan's opening up to trade, that the resulting shifts in industrial structure 
worked against this factor. 
Turning from empirics to theory, I find it instructive to look at the implications of 
(1) in a number of special models. This shows both the usefulness of the result and its 
limitations. It is a result we had better like because, in many cases, it may be all we have. 
To pursue this approach, I use the tools that Albert Schweinberger and I adopted to 
deriving (1) and some other corollaries in our 1986 paper. Like Dixit and Norman, this 
uses dual techniques, with the added feature that we introduced a single function to 
summarize the economy as a whole in its role as a virtual trader of factors. Thanks to 
Avinash and Victor, most of us are familiar with the GNP function,   , as a 
shorthand summary of an economy's technology, giving the maximum value of GNP 
attainable facing given commodity prices  
( vpg , )
p   and with given factor endowments   . It is 
a tiny step from that to subtract GNP from national expenditure, represented by a consumer 
expenditure function   , where  u   is aggregate welfare, to form what Albert and I 
called the Trade Expenditure Function: 
v
( upe , )
( ) ( ) ( )vpgupevupE ,,,, −≡      (2) 
This equals the difference between national expenditure and GNP, so not surprisingly its 
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derivatives with respect to prices equal the vector of net imports of goods:   . The 
next step is to assume that prices equal unit costs in each sector, and to replace the goods 
prices  
mE p =
p   with the vector of unit cost functions  ( )wc  . Now we can define a Factor Trade 
Expenditure Function: 
( ) ( )[ ]vuwcEvuwE ,,,,~ ≡      (3) 
This has the nice feature that its derivatives with respect to factor prices equal the net 
factor content functions, and shows explicitly that they equal the product of the unit factor 
requirements in each sector (given by the matrix of derivatives of the unit cost functions,  




     (4) 
Armed with these tools, return to (1) and ask why it does not extend easily to 
comparisons between countries. (Similar arguments apply to comparisons between autarky 
and free-trade equilibria in a single country. However, they require a little more notation 
and I am already above my quota.) Assume for simplicity that the rest of the world can be 
represented as a single country, and that it also exhibits a result such as (1), with asterisks 
denoting foreign variables: 
0. 10 >∗∗ Mw        (5) 
Now add this to the corresponding result for the home country (1) to get, after a little 
manipulation: 
( ) ( ) 0.. 110100 >++− ∗∗∗ MMwMww      (6) 
If we could show that the first term on the right-hand side is positive, we would have a 
                                                 
4All these derivatives are evaluated at domestic factor prices, which becomes important shortly. 
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significantly stronger generalization of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem: this term equals the 
free-trade value of net factor imports, valued at the difference between the home and 
foreign autarky prices. The second term can therefore be interpreted as a measure of the 
deviation from Heckscher-Ohlin: factors that are more expensive in autarky at home 
relative to abroad may nevertheless be exported rather than imported on average if this 
term is sufficiently positive. Recall that, in deriving the general proof of comparative 
advantage, there is a parallel derivation with the big difference that it simplifies a lot, since 
it yields: 
( ) ( ) 0.. 110100 >++− ∗∗∗ mmpmpp      (7) 
Here the second term vanishes because, in this two-country world, the sum of the net 
goods trade vectors,   , is equal to zero. Hence we have a prediction about the 
direction of goods trade which can be reexpressed as a correlation: goods that are more 
expensive in autarky at home relative to abroad are always imported on average after trade. 
By contrast, the sum of the net factor trade vectors in (6),  
∗+ 11 mm
∗+ 11 MM  , is not equal to zero 
in general. Substituting from (4) into (6) we can see why: 
( ) ( ) 0.. 1110100 >−+− ∗∗∗ mAAwMww     (8) 
The problem is that the net factor import vector  1M   in equation (1) must be evaluated 
using the techniques of production used in the home country,   , whereas  1A ∗1M   in (5) 
must be evaluated using the techniques used in the foreign country,   . Requiring these 
to be equal is a tall order, though there is one important special case where it holds: as 
every schoolgirl knows (perhaps I exaggerate just a little), this is when technology is 
identical internationally and factor prices are equalized by free trade. In that case the 




content functions can be estimated directly, as long as both countries remain in the same 
cone of diversification. Equation (8) also implies a new result: if the home country uses 
more efficient techniques in all sectors than foreign, then every term in    is 
negative, and so the Heckscher-Ohlin correlation  
∗− AA
( ) 100 .Mww ∗−   is positive, even though 
factor prices need not be equalized. 
I want to end with two other, less orthodox, applications of (1). Both involve 
models which are not usually thought of as having much in common with the Heckscher-
Ohlin model. However, both have production sectors which can be represented by a GNP 
function, allowing the application of the tools developed so far. 
The first is to the specific-factors model, often seen as the antithesis of Heckscher-
Ohlin, though of course just another special case of a general competitive model. Dixit and 
Norman derived the GNP function for this model, but it takes a much simpler and more 
tractable form in a special case recently introduced by Jim Anderson (2009). This assumes 
that production functions in each sector are Cobb-Douglas, and that each has the same 
share of labor. Thus the GNP function is the solution to the following maximization 
problem: 
( ) [ ]LxxpkLpg iiiili =Σ≡ :max,, lkl iiii =Σ
− ,1 ααφ    (9) 
where  L   is the scalar endowment of mobile labor, while    is the vector of the 
endowments of sector-specific capital stocks   . Now define  
k
ik ikK Σ≡   as the aggregate 
capital endowment, and  KkiKi /≡λ   as the share of capital in each sector. Jim's result is 
that the GNP function for this model can be expressed in a particularly simple form: 
( ) ( )[ ] ααα αφλλ −− −Σ≡= 11 1 1,,, iiKiK pG:whereGKLKLpg   (10) 
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This is the product of two sub-functions, one a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of the overall 
factor endowments  L   and  K  , and the other a CES aggregate of goods prices, where the 
weights are the sectoral capital shares. The nice feature of this specification is that we can 
get explicit expressions for all variables in general equilibrium. In particular, we can 
evaluate the Heckscher-Ohlin deviation term in (8) and explore the conditions under which 
we might expect to observe Heckscher-Ohlin properties even in a specific-factors world. 
My second non-standard application is to the model of monopolistic competition 
with heterogeneous firms developed by Marc Melitz (2003). This model has already 
proved its usefulness as a guide to empirical work and as a workhorse for many exciting 
theoretical developments. Only recently, however, has it been shown that it is closely 
related to traditional general equilibrium models. I am referring in particular to the 
demonstration by Rob Feenstra and Hiau Looi Kee (2008) that the production sector of the 
Melitz model, with a Pareto distribution of firms, can be represented by a GNP function 
essentially identical to the one I have used above. Of course, goods prices are endogenous 
in a monopolistically competitive equilibrium, but we can take foreign demand parameters 
as exogenous and relate domestic goods prices to factor prices using standard properties of 
monopolistic competition with CES preferences. This allows a Heckscher-Ohlin-type 
result to be derived for a multisectoral version of the Melitz model too, by applying the 
approach I have used above. 
It is appropriate to end by relating one of Alan's great results to the work of one of 
his students. I hope it shows that we have not heard the last of Heckscher and Ohlin, and 
also reminds us of another public good which Alan has provided through the outstanding 
students he has mentored, many of them here today. Heckscher and Ohlin have a lot to be 
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It has been a pleasure to re-read some of Alan Deardor¤s papers on trade and growth, and to read
others for the rst time. These papers are typical of Alans work; they artfully tease new insights
on important issues from simple, familiar models.
It is tting to begin my review with A Geometry of Growth and Trade.Alan loves diagrams
and given his skill in developing them, it is easy to see why. His diagrammatic analyses are as
incisive as any algebraic treatment and more pleasing to the eye.
Deardor¤ (1974) provides a simple geometric tool for analyzing trade and growth in a small
open Solovian economy. Consider a small economy that produces a single consumer good and a
single investment good from two factors of production, capital and labor. For simplicity, take the
labor force as xed.1 Suppose that households save a constant fraction s of income and that capital
depreciates at constant rate . In Figure 1, R (p;K) represents the revenue or national-product
function for an economy facing world relative price p of the consumer good and having a stock of
capital K. As is well known from microeconomic theory, a competitive economy maximizes the
value of national output given prices. Therefore, the equilibrium allocation of capital and labor is
such that R (p;K) is the economys national income. And, as is well known from trade theory, a
two-sector economy facing a given relative price will specialize in producing the labor-intensive good
when its capital stock is small, specialize in producing the capital-intensive good when its capital
stock is large, and will produce both goods in an intermediate cone of diversication.Therefore,
the national-product function has two curved portions that depict the diminishing returns to capital
when only one good is being produced, and a linear segment whose slope represents the constant
marginal product of capital within the diversication cone.
With a constant savings propensity, sR (p;K) represents national savings, which fully nances
national investment in an economy that cannot borrow or lend internationally. The dashed line,
K, represents aggregate deprecation, and the gap between the two is net investment. The capital
stock grows when sR (p;K) exceeds K and shrinks when it is smaller. The intersection of the two
curves depicts the steady state. The diagram readily yields predictions about the evolution of the
trade pattern and about the e¤ects of changes in savings behavior or world prices on the growth
path and the ultimate steady state. For example, an increase in the savings propensity leads to a
larger steady-state stock of capital, more output of the capital-intensive good, and greater exports
(or fewer imports) of that good.
Deardor¤ (1974) employs the simple assumption that national savings is a constant fraction of
national income. But a similar tool to his can be used to study transitional dynamics in an open
economy with optimal savings behavior. Suppose the representative consumer allocates spending










Figure 1: Two-Sector Solovian Trade and Growth
to maximize an intertemporal utility function of the form2Z 1
t
e ( t) log c () d
where c () is consumption at time  and  is a constant discount factor. Then, as is well known,
the Euler equation implies
_E
E
= i  ; (1)
i.e., the households adjusts expenditure E = pc so that the rate of growth of spending is equal
to the di¤erence between the interest rate and the discount rate. Capital is the only asset in the
model and the investment good is numeraire, so the rate of interest i must equal the real return
on capital net of depreciation; i.e., i = r (p;K)  , where r (p;K) = @R=@K is the rental rate on
capital. Finally, savings which is the di¤erence between national income and spending nances
net investment as in Deardor¤ (1974):
_K = R(p;K)  E   K. (2)
Equations (1) and (2) can be used to construct a phase diagram that bears a strong similarity
to the Deardor¤ diagram. In Figure 2, the _K = 0 curve represents the equation E = R (p;K) K.
The qualitative properties of this curve follow from those of the national-product function, which
Deardor¤ has discussed. The _E = 0 curve depicts the values of K and E such that r (p;K) = +.
Two comments are in order about this curve. First, the level of spending E does not a¤ect anything
in this equation, so the curve is in fact a vertical line. Second, the factor-price equalization
theorem implies a single value of r for all values of K in the diversication cone. If this value of r
2 It is easy to handle the case of a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution; the text describes the special
case where this elasticity is equal to one.
2
does not happen to equal  + , as it generally will not for arbitrary p, then the _E = 0 curve will







Figure 2: Two-Sector Neoclassical Trade and Growth
The gure shows the arrowsof adjustment that apply to either side of each curve. It is readily
seen that the system exhibits saddle-path stability. For given initial K, there is a single value of
the initial level of spending that avoids K ! 0 and K ! 1 as time progresses. This initial value
of E is the only one that allows for satisfaction of the intertemporal budget constraint and the
transversality condition for optimization of lifetime utility. The economy approaches the steady
state along the stable arm, denoted by SS in the gure.
The gure can be used much as Deardor¤s original diagram. It is easy to track the evolution
of the trade pattern and to perform comparative statics with respect to changes in the discount
rate or the international relative price. One conclusion di¤ers from that in the Solovian world: a
small open economy with optimal savings and a constant discount rate is quite unlikely to remain
incompletely specialized in the long run.
I see several important substantive themes in Alans other writings on trade and growth that
have gained traction in the more recent literature. First, trade may be harmful to a growing
economy in some circumstances. Second, and related, an open economy may be trapped in poverty
in a world with multiple steady states. Third, growth may be sustained by trade in a neoclassical
economy that would be doomed to stagnation if it remained closed to international exchange. I
take up each point in turn.
In Deardor¤ (1973), Alan analyzed the e¤ects of trade on per capita consumption in steady state
and in the approach to steady state. He considered an open economy capable of producing a single
consumer good and a single investment good that saves a constant proportion of its income, as in
Deardor¤ (1974). He proved, for example, that a small economy that saves in excess of the golden
rule savings ratio will experience a reduction in steady-state consumption if the world relative price
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of the consumption good is a bit above its autarky price.3 If its savings rate falls short of the
golden rule savings ratio, then steady-state consumption falls with an opening to trade if the world
relative price of the consumption good is a bit below the autarky price. Intuitively, steady-state
consumption increases if a country starts in autarky with less investment than is needed on the
margin to maintain a unit of capital and it exports the investment good, or if it starts with more
capital than is needed on the margin to maintain a unit of capital and it imports the capital good.
The paper also considers the e¤ects of trade on per capita consumption in the short run; that
is, in the moments after an opening of trade. If trade causes the relative price of the consumption
good to rise, thereby generating exports of this good, then per capita consumption will initially
fall. If the relative price moves in the opposite direction and the country exports the investment
good, per capita consumption will rise.
This analysis su¤ers from two shortcomings. First, as Alan himself recognized, it is not typically
optimal for households to consume a constant fraction of their current income. Alan thus relates
his ndings to the theory of the second best. But convincing second-best arguments that question
the gains from trade usually refer to realistic market failures, not to empirically unsupported and
somewhat arbitrary assumptions of sub-optimal behavior. Second, it is impossible to evaluate
the welfare e¤ects of an opening of trade that induces short-run gains and long-run losses (or
vice versa) without reference to some intertemporal utility function. The Solow model o¤ers no
such utility function and therefore no metric for welfare comparisons. Subsequent to Deardor¤
(1973), Samuelson (1975) and Smith (1979, 1984) showed rigorously that a neoclassical economy
with well-functioning markets always gains from trade when savings decisions derive from utility
maximization, no matter what is the form of its intertemporal utility function.
But the possibility of losses from trade has been emphasized in recent writings on trade and
growth in non-neoclassical settings. Most common are models in which growth is driven by local
knowledge spillovers. These can be spillovers in human capital accumulation, as in Lucas (1988)
and Stokey (1991), or spillovers in the R&D process, as in Young (1993), Feenstra (1996) and
Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 8; 1994).
The idea is quite simple. Consider a two-sector economy, one in which technology is static and
another in which technology can improve with the accumulation of human capital or knowledge.
There are spillovers in the accumulation process that o¤set the private diminishing returns, so
that growth can be sustained. In the autarky equilibrium, the economy is incompletely specialized
and the ongoing activity in the dynamic sector ensures the continuing accumulation of knowledge.
Although the autarky allocation of resources to the dynamic sector will be sub-optimally small in
the absence of a Pigouvian subsidy that addresses the externality, growth is sustained. Now open
the economy to trade and suppose that the country has a comparative disadvantage in the dynamic
sector, either due to its relatively unsuitable resource endowments or to an initial disadvantage of
history that gives its trade partner a technological head start. In either case, the opening of
3The golden rule savings rate is the value of s that generates the golden rule capital-to-labor ratio as its steady
state. The golden rule capital-to-labor ratio, in turn, is the value of K=L that makes the marginal product of capital
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Figure 3: Multiple Steady States
trade will cause the country to specialize relatively and perhaps fully in the industry with a static
technology. Its growth in output will slow and perhaps cease as a result of trade. Even so, trade
may be gainful, since the country will be able to import the good produced in the dynamic sector
at a lower price than in autarky. But it is easy to construct examples in which trade is harmful in
these circumstances, for reasons to do with the theory of the second best. Inasmuch as the autarky
equilibrium entails too little production of the dynamic good, if trade drives resources out of this
industry it can generate losses by exacerbating a pre-existing distortion. Of course, losses from
trade would not be possible if the opening of trade were accompanied by an appropriate Pigouvian
subsidy to the externality-generating activity.
Deardor¤ (2001) makes a related but di¤erent point, drawing on work by Galor (1996). He con-
siders a neoclassical economy that potentially can produce three goods, one investment good and
two consumption goods, with capital and labor. The industries di¤er in their factor intensities, so
there are two cones of diversication. Following Galor, he supposes that savings are approximately
proportional to the wage bill, perhaps because there are overlapping generations and each genera-
tion earns capital income only in the last period of life, when it consumes all. Figure 3 analogous
to Figure 1 shows the aggregate savings for this economy as a function of its capital stock. For
low values of K, the economy is incompletely specialized and the wage bill rises as capital is accu-
mulated. The region between K1 and K2 represents the rst diversication cone, where the country
produces the two least capital-intensive goods. In this range, factors prices are insensitive to factor
endowments, so the wage bill is constant, as is aggregate savings. Further capital accumulation
leads to a range of specialization in the intermediate good, again with a rising wage bill, and then
a second region of diversication, for capital stocks between K3 and K4. Finally, if capital were
to accumulate beyond K4, the economy would specialize in producing the most capital-intensive
good, and savings would rise with K.
As is clear from the gure, this economy can have three distinct steady states, the rst and third
of which are locally stable. In other words, an economy such as this can get stuck in a poverty
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trap.If it starts with a capital stock less than K1 and trades with an otherwise identical economy
that begins with more capital, then it will accumulate capital until it reaches the rst steady state,
whereupon its growth will cease at a relatively low level of per capita income.4 Di¤erences in initial
conditions are su¢ cient to generate long-run di¤erences in income and welfare for countries that
are otherwise the same in terms of their technologies and savings behavior.
This is an interesting nding inasmuch as multiple equilibria are not common in neoclassical
growth models. The allusion to an overlapping-generations setup is intriguing, as it seems possible
to have a poverty trap together with fully optimal savings behavior and convex technologies.
The potential for multiple equilibria among identical countries also arises in non-neoclassical
settings. In fact, this possibility is quite natural in models with static or dynamic increasing
returns to scale. Azariadis and Drazen (1990) o¤er an example with multiple steady states even
in the closed economy. They consider an economy with threshold externalities; i.e., externalities
generated by human capital that are relatively weak when the stock of human capital is small, but
grow stronger as the skill level increases. In such a setting, an economy can get trapped in an
equilibrium with low skills, despite the fact that it has the potential for sustained growth were it
to manage somehow to escape the trap.5 Young (1993), Feenstra (1996), Grossman and Helpman
(1991, ch.8) and others show the possibility for trade to generate permanent income (or growth rate)
di¤erences between otherwise identical countries that di¤er in their initial levels of technological
development. They consider an international equilibrium with trade between countries that di¤er
only in their initial levels of technological development. Were the countries to remain closed, they
would converge upon similar long-run steady state growth paths. However, with trade, the leading
country gains an initial advantage in the more dynamic sector, and the advantage is perpetuated
(or even extended) over time.
In neoclassical growth models, diminishing returns to capital typically spell the stagnation of
growth in per capita incomes as increases in the capital-to-labor ratio drive down the marginal return
to investment. Growth need not peter out however, as Solow (1956) himself noted, if the return
to capital is bounded from below. This idea of bounded long-run returns to capital has featured
prominently in a branch of the literature on endogenous growth, where models with such features
have been termed AK models.See, for example, Jones and Manuelli (1990) for an application to
the open economy. However, many have questioned the plausibility of the assumption that marginal
returns will be bounded from below as the capital-to-labor ratio grows indenitely.
Deardor¤ (1994) was one of the rst to point out that growth can be sustained in some cir-
cumstances in an open neoclassical economy even if the technology does not admit a lower bound
on the return to capital. His explanation relies on cross-country di¤erences in population growth
rates and the opportunities a¤orded by international investment.6
4 If the economy is large, the equilibrium prices may be changing in the transition, in which case the national income
and aggregate savings curves will be shifting about. Nonetheless, the point remains that there can be multiple steady
states and a stable equilibrium at a low level of national income. With more than three goods, the number steady
states can increase.
5One way out might be with a big push,as emphasized by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
6Deardor¤ (1999) uses a similar framework to study the evolution of international inequality in per capita incomes.
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Consider a pair of Solovian economies that each produce a single good. Let the population
growth rates and the savings rates be exogenous and country specic. Alan refers to the country
with the slower population growth as the North and the country with the faster population growth
as the South. Technologies are such that both the North and the South will approach constant
steady-levels of per capita income in their autarkic equilibria. But suppose now that the North
can invest its savings in the South. Then, for some savings rates, it avoids the otherwise inevitable
rise in the capital-to-labor ratio by making use of the ever-larger Southern labor force. When the
North has slower population growth and a su¢ ciently large savings rate, per capita income in the
North grows forever. For even higher Northern savings rates, national income growth in the North
matches the rate of population growth in the South, and residents of the North come to own a
signicant portion of the worlds capital despite being a vanishing fraction of the worlds labor force.
Deardor¤ (1994) observes that, in circumstances in which the North enjoys sustained growth in per
capita income but national income growth less than the rate of population growth in the South,
a change in the Norths savings propensity will change its long-run growth, just as in models of
endogenous growth. In short, Alan points out that, by investing abroad, a relatively small country
(in terms of population) can escape diminishing returns at home.
This argument bears a family resemblance to a related point made by Ventura (1997). He
considers a small, Heckscher-Ohlin economy that trades freely at xed prices. The economy has
two sectors with diminishing (and non-bounded) returns to capital in each, and savings derived
from intertemporal utility maximization. Without trade, this economy would approach a steady
state. With trade, it will do so as well, as was illustrated in Figure 2. But, Ventura points out,
the country will experience a potentially-long growth phase when its endowments are within the
diversication cone during which the return to capital will remain constant. The constancy of
returns to capital reects the factor-price equalization theorem applies during this phase. But as
long as the country remains incompletely specialized, it is as if it had access to an AK technology.
So the growth experience for a long time might mimic that which would be predicted by such a
model. And, of course, changes in policy and in savings behavior will alter the growth rate during
this episode.
Deardor¤s (1994) story of sustained growth is an interesting one that deserves further attention
and development. To me, it seems to beg for the endogenization of population growth. Can
populations diverge forever? Might the South of Deardor¤s model experience a demographic
transition at some stage? Or might trade postpone or even prevent such a transition? Going
further, can we justify sustained di¤erences in savings behavior? Are these di¤erences cultural
or do they reect the growth experience? There is much to be done with endogenous preferences
and endogenous procreation in models of trade and growth.7
Let me end this review where I began. I have long been a big fan of Alan Deardor¤, whose work
is always clean, crisp and elegant. His papers on trade and growth complement the many other
areas to which he has contributed, including his brilliant work on comparative advantage and his
7See Galor and Weil (2000) for a very interesting contribution of this sort.
7
very useful applied research on trade policy. I am happy to be part of this celebration and look
forward to his continued productivity for many years to come!
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I am pleased and honored to participate in this celebration of Alan 
Deardorff. He has contributed enormously to the profession through his research, 
his teaching, his policy contributions, and his good citizenship in the profession. I 
won’t comment on his teaching and good citizenship except to say that I’ve 
encountered many of Alan’s former students, both graduate and undergraduate, 
and all speak enthusiastically about his support and role in their education, 
including in some cases their decision to go on to graduate school in economics. 
And many of his former students, who are participating in this symposium, have 
continued down paths opened up by Alan, and of course, his colleagues. 
One of the many impressive things about Alan has been the breadth of his 
interests and contributions, as the organization of today’s program attests. And not 
only have his interests and contributions been broad, they have encompassed both 
positive and normative theoretical and empirical work. 
The marching orders for these comments included the request that we 
reminisce a bit about the development of the field of international economics. In 
thinking about comparative advantage and growth, that is almost a natural starting 
point. 
 
Recall that the Heckscher-Ohlin model has been around for a long time. 
Even Ellsworth’s classic 1938 textbook presented it, suggesting that there would 
be a “tendency” toward factor price equalization as labor-abundant countries 
exported their labor-intensive goods and capital-abundant countries their capital-
intensive goods. The Heckscher-Ohlin model was very attractive intuitively. It 
seemed to fill in a hole left by the Ricardian model by explaining – apparently – 
why there were differences in relative costs and prices between countries. 
But in the late 1940s, Paul Samuelson contributed his paper showing that 
with incomplete specialization (and the other assumptions well known to all of us) 
there would be factor price equalization. And, at about the same time, Leontief 
came up with his famous factor content of trade paper, now referred to universally 
as the Leontief paradox. 
Both of these papers raised enormous and challenging questions about the 
HOS model, as it was soon called, which occupied much of the intellectual energy 
of international trade theorists and empiricists over the next several decades. For, 
while the HOS model was appealing in its original “tendency to” form, the logical 
conclusions that derived from careful examination of the underpinnings of the 
model seemed entirely at variance with the facts, and Leontief’s empirical findings 
were even more challenging. When the workhorse model seemed to fly so much in 
the face of reality, it was small wonder that we focused on trying to figure out why. 
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Efforts were theoretical and empirical. On the theoretical side, more goods 
and factors, specific factors (at the extreme there was a paper with one specific 
factor for each good, which seemed somewhat tautological), constant or varying 
elasticities of substitution (with the possibility of factor intensity reversals), many 
countries (was Germany labor-abundant relative to the U.S. or capital-abundant 
relative to developing countries?), and many more variants were tried. While 
examination of the bilateral factor content of trade was shown theoretically not to 
be the correct test, empirically many pairwise countries’ trade patterns were 
examined with mixed results. 
Alan’s early contributions focused on this central range of issues (although, 
to his credit, he never forgot that comparative advantage and the arguments for free 
trade rested on differences in relative autarkic prices and NOT on the reasons for 
them in many plausible models). Much of his early work, “Weak Links in the 
Chain of Comparative Advantage’, “General Validity of Law of Comparative 
Advantage”, “General Validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem”, and “An 
Interpretation of the Factor Content of Trade” with Bob Staiger were all of this ilk, 
as was his masterful contribution to the Jones-Kenen handbook on “Testing Trade 
Theories and Predicting Trade Flows”. That interest has continued, as perusal of 
his c.v. shows, with his 2001 EJ paper producing a 3 good model permitting two 
cones of diversification with factor price equalization in each cone but divergence 
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between them. He believes that the “two-cone” world economy better fits the facts 
than a single factor-price-equalization outcome, and has contributed significantly 
to understanding some north-south issues on that basis, arguing that as the south 
now attempts development, countries in the north are threatened in a way they 
were not earlier in the growth of the world economy. 
But Alan has also delved into issues of trade and growth going way beyond 
the HOS model (which, of course, could immediately be transformed into a growth 
model). Perhaps because of his focus on many-goods models, his range of interests 
has covered a wide area: intellectual property, outsourcing, sources of the rich-poor 
divide in trade negotiations, political economy, and, of course, the impact of 
alternative proposed liberalizations of trade under the WTO.  
 In addition to twists and turns of HOS models, of course, we have in recent 
years begun to understand other sources of gains from trade: imperfect competition 
when the variety and quality of goods can be greatly increased, while costs are 
lowered, through trade; the effects of increased competition resulting from 
international trade on individual firms’ incentives to produce more efficiently; and 
much more. I doubt that any of us now thinks that any one model fully explains the 
pattern of trade. But I also doubt that any would deny that factor proportions are 





power and the limits of factor proportions in multi commodity, multi country, 
models has contributed significantly, and advanced, that understanding. 
 In each of these areas, and many more to be covered in other panels, Alan 
has been thoroughly professional in seeking to understand the underlying sources 
of comparative advantage, the benefits of international trade, and the effects of 
alternative policies on trade. His work is cited in professional journals, in policy 
analyses, and in textbooks. A perusal of two textbooks that I happened to have on 
my shelf showed Alan cited several of his early papers on the HOS model, for his 
“Weak Links in the Chain of Comparative Advantage”, for much of his work with 
Bob Stern on the impact of trade liberalization in the various MTN rounds, and for 
much that will be discussed in other panels. 
Alan, I salute you for your intellectual contributions, your thorough 
professionalism, and for your many advances in our understanding of the 
international economy. This celebration is well deserved. 
Kt10-29-09 







 Let me begin by saluting Alan Deardorff for his enormous contributions to trade 
theory per se and importantly to parts of theory that have served as formulations for 
empirical analysis.  There are many I could cite from his large body of work.  I will cite 
just three: Alan Deardorff (1998) is among those who provided a theoretical foundation 
for the workhorse of empirical analysis of bilateral trade flows, namely the gravity model 
that goes back to Jan Tinbergen (1962) and Hans Linneman (1966) of the Tinbergen 
School.  The others are his classic papers on the general validity of comparative 
advantage, one (Deardorff, 1980) Ricardian model-based and the other (Deardorff, 
1982) Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) based.  Alan embeds each in a multi-country, 
multi-factor, multi-commodity Arrow-Debreu competitive general equilibrium model and 
then asks and answers a well-posed question: which of the basic propositions of the 
simple Ricardian or HOS models survive in more general settings and if they do, in what 
form.  More generally, Alan, like many distinguished theorists, uses propositions of 
theories with their strong and unrealistic assumptions, about consumer, producer 
behaviour, and the markets as benchmarks for asking and answering in a systematic 
and coherent way, the implications of well-specified departures from the strong 
assumptions.  Thus, in his use the role of theories and their conclusions is only as a 
device for generating propositions rigorously which serve as benchmarks for systematic 
                                            
1 In preparing these remarks, I have drawn on Srinivasan (2001), Srinivasan (2008) and Srinivasan and 
Wallack (2004).  
analysis of reality.  He does not have to believe the theories literally for this purpose. I 
doubt whether he or any distinguished theorist ever did, 
 
       Recently there has been a flood of critiques by economists and media persons, 
some times by economists serving as newspaper columnists, of macroeconomic theory 
and policy making prior to the onset of the financial crisis. It would seem that the critics 
show little understanding of the proper role of theory in thinking about policy making in 
the real world.  Some, including distinguished theorists of trade and open economy 
macroeconomics,  who ought to know better, charge those theorists from whom they 
apparently differ for other reasons possibly including political beliefs of theorists as 
literal believers in the conclusions of their theory, be it of efficient markets or of dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium, unbounded rationality or what have you!  Some even go 
far as basing their charges on a “pithy” quote or two in and out of context from those 
they criticize.  Clearly such economist critics and their critiques do not advance our 
discipline. 
 Recent contributions to trade theory are clearly exciting and continue their 
traditional base on general equilibrium theory.  Unfortunately, trade policy making and 
debates, for example, on globalization continue to be prime examples of what Alan 
Blinder calls Murphy’s Law of economics, namely, that economists have the least 
influence on policy in areas such as trade where they know more than others and are 
least divided.  
 Turning to the topic of this panel, I want to draw attention to an important and 
policy relevant distinction between economic growth and economic development.  
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Although the two have important linkages and openness to international trade and 
investment contributes to both, they are not the same.  In many ways objectives of 
development go beyond the objective of accelerating growth, and achieving the former 
often depends on overcoming or alleviating domestic institutional constraints including 
governance much more intensively than for achieving growth objectives.  In addition, 
both sets of objectives are multidimensional, involving different characteristics, different 
time horizons and so on.  Lack of understanding of this distinction and its complexity 
has led to the misnaming of the Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations as the 
Development round that has led, on the one hand, to unrealistic expectations that once 
the Doha Round is successfully concluded with an agreement with a “balanced 
outcome,” then the development problems would be solved and its goals achieved as 
well, and, on the other hand, to fears, if not despair, that if Doha fails, achievement of 
development goals will be stalled forever.  Neither the expectations nor the fears are 
warranted.  This is because the sources of most constraints that inhibit faster 
development are domestic.  A successful conclusion of the Doha Round could, though 
not necessarily would, ease some of the external constraints on development, it 
certainly would not ensure development success if the domestic constraints are not 
addressed. 
 On the relation between economic growth and international trade, long ago 
Dennis Robertson (1940) described “trade as an engine of growth”, meaning that 
greater openness to trade would trigger faster growth.  On the other hand Irving Kravis 
(1970) described “trade as a handmaiden of growth”, meaning that faster growth would 
lead to greater trade.  The existence of a possible two-way relationship between the 
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two, that is, the endogeneity of outcomes of openness and growth means the results of 
empirical analyses based on a single equation, a “reduced form” kind with one of them 
as the variable to be explained and the other as one of the explanatory variables could 
vary depending on how the endogeneity is addressed.  This opens the door for the 
search for clever instruments, a search that has unduly occupied some of the creative 
members of our profession recently!  Apart from this, most empirical studies do not 
recognize the results of “second best” theory, as applied to trade and domestic 
distortions.  For example, removing some distortions on trade while keeping intact 
others on trade and also non-trade related ones, need not lead to the “first best” 
expectations of improvements in efficiency.  Moreover, whether or not it would depends 
on the local context. 
 Simply put, the sources of aggregate real GDP growth of an economy are 
basically three:  growth of inputs into the production process, efficiency in the allocation 
of inputs across the production of goods and services, and technical progress in the 
sense of successful innovation in discovering new products and more and more 
productive technologies and in their adoption into production.  Openness could 
potentially contribute to all three sources: first by separating the domestic use of inputs 
from their domestic endowments or supply.  For example, a country which wishes to 
use more than or less of its endowment capital (or for labour of any type) can import or 
export some of it.  By exporting its excess capital endowment, for example, it could earn 
more from its use abroad than at home.  Thus, trade in inputs yields gains both trading 
partners.  The link between improvement in efficiency through exploitation of 
comparative advantage, by shifting use of inputs towards goods and services in which 
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the domestic economy has a comparative cost advantage and growth is straightforward.  
To the extent the gains in efficiency though such reallocation of inputs are in part saved 
and invested, obviously such efficiency gains from trade contribute to growth.  Even if 
the efficiency gains are fully consumed, their contribution to increasing welfare is 
evident. Finally, the mechanisms through which openness serves as a source of 
innovation in the domestic economy are several:  horizontal and vertically spillovers of 
knowledge from foreign direct investment, learning of new products or more productive 
ways of producing existing products by domestic exporters and others. 
 Whether or not the potential contribution of greater openness to the three 
sources of growth are realized will depend on the functioning of domestic institutions 
including importantly the financial and legal systems, domestic political economy, the 
existence of relevant markets, their depth and efficiency and so on.  Distortions in any of 
these could limit the beneficial effects of openness and could even reverse them.  
Unfortunately, much of the recent empirical literature on globalization on growth, 
poverty, employment, etc., does not often explicitly build the various mechanisms by 
which globalization could have effects and test for their absence or presence, but taking 
into effect any constraints that may inhibit their full use.  I am deeply skeptical of the 
“dummy variable” approach for assessing the effects of domestic factors. In my view, 
the dummy variables are mute and dumb on what the mechanisms factors through 
which they might have contributed to the observed effects. 
 In saying all this, I am not dismissing the very impressive recent theoretical 
developments on foreign trade, investment and growth based on preference for variety, 
economic geography of agglomeration effects, the development of process-based trade 
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as compared to trade in products and the related phenomena of outsourcing and off-
shoring, and above all, shifting the analysis to the incentives operating at the firm level 
for participating in foreign trade and increasing the extent of their participation, if they 
decide to participate.  Nor do I dismiss the surprisingly few empirical studies which rest 
on sound theoretical foundations. I expect  to see in future the recent trend in exciting 
theoretical developments to continue now that  more of the recent Ph.D. cohorts have 
entered trade theory and not only theory,  but also theory with a focus on their empirical  
applicability and policy relevance. By their research these cohorts would be paying a 
fitting tribute to Alan Deardorff and his contributions. 
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COMMENTS ON ALAN DEARDORFFS CONTRIBUTIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF 
THE GAINS FROM TRADE AND GLOBALIZATION 
Robert E. Baldwin 
 It is an honor to participate in a festschrift for Alan Deardorff.  Alan is a master theorist.  
He has made major contributions to our understanding of so many economic concepts and 
relationships in international economics with his modeling and analytical skills.  Moreover, he 
has done so in an exceptionally clear manner, often using geometry as well as algebra to make 
his points.   
 I have been asked to comment on Alan’s contributions on the topic of gains from trade 
and globalization.  Very rightly, I think, Alan takes a very broad view of what constitutes 
globalization.   He takes globalization to mean the increase in international transactions in 
markets for goods, services, some factors of production, plus the growth and expanded scope of 
institutions that straddle national borders such as firms, governments, international organizations, 
and nongovernmental organizations.  As he and Bob Stern say in one of their papers, 
globalization is not only growth in international trade but expansion of foreign direct investment, 
multinational corporations, integration of world markets and resulting financial capital flows, 
extraterritorial reach of government policies, attention by NGOs to issues that span the globe, 
and the constraints imposed on government policies imposed by international institutions.  
 Alan has written a number of papers exploring the welfare and other economic effects of 
some of the newer and less familiar forms of globalization such as fragmentation, business and 
social networking and outsourcing.1 Let me summarize some of his contributions on these topics.  
Following Jones and Kierzkowski (1997) who first introduced the term, Alan defines 
                                     
1 See References for a listing of Alan’s papers covered in this comment.   
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fragmentation as the splitting of a production process into two or more steps.  We generally think 
of a two step fragmentation process as arising because of technological progress that permits a 
country to specialize in the fragmented segment in which it has a comparative advantage and 
import the other intermediate input.  This enables the country to produce a larger amount of the 
final good than formerly possible and thus move to a higher budget line than it faced before that 
fragmentation process.  If the country is small so that world prices are fixed, the country cannot 
lose in welfare terms, as Alan shows.  However, as we know from the Stolper-Samuelson 
relationship, particular groups within a country can lose even if the country as a whole gains.  
Moreover, if a country is large so that world prices can change as a result of the fragmentation 
process, he also shows that it is possible for the country’s terms of trade to worsen sufficiently 
for it to end up at a lower welfare level.  However, he concludes that fragmentation is more 
likely to benefit countries rather than make them worse off.   
 In his analysis of networking, which he regards as a decline in trade costs, Alan disagrees 
with the pioneer in this topic, namely, Jim Rauch, when it comes to the question of whether an 
increase in networking can reduce a country’s welfare.  Rauch argues that this is possible 
whereas Alan argues that it is not, at least in an undistorted world economy.  The reason is 
simply that trade costs are real costs, using up real resources whereas, in contrast, tariffs do not.  
Because a reduction in real costs uses real resources, a reduction in these costs permits the world 
economy to do exactly what it did before and still have some resources left over.  As he says, a 
competitive economy will then use these released resources to produce more and yielding a 
world output that is worth more at the new equilibrium prices than the outputs previously 
produced.  But perhaps Rauch has in mind an economy in which there already exists economic 
distortions.  
  3
 Before leaving the topic of the welfare effects of such activities as fragmentation, I want 
to discuss briefly just what economists mean when they say that a country or the world gains 
from trade.  As Alan points out, our current understanding of what is meant by a country gaining 
from trade dates from two articles by Samuelson, one in 1939 and another in 1962, almost 25 
years later.  Assuming for simplicity that there are only two individuals and two goods in a 
distortion-free economy, Samuelson in his 1962 article introduces the notion of point and 
situation utility possibility frontiers that depict, respectively, the maximum ordinal utility 
reached by each individual by distributing between the two individuals a particular quantity of 
goods attainable under autarky or free trade in every possible manner and by distributing 
between the two individuals the sets of optimal quantities of the goods that can be obtained under 
autarky or free trade.  The situation utility possibility frontier is the envelope of all the optimal 
collections of goods that could be obtained under one of these policies, i.e., all the point utility 
possibility curves attainable under autarky or free trade. 
Since the maximum quantities of the two goods achievable under a policy of free trade is 
greater (except for one point) than under a policy of autarky, the utility possibility curve based on 
the free trade situation lies entirely outside the utility possibility curve based on the autarky 
situation.  This means that that by appropriate lump sum redistribution (assumed to be costless) 
that would change production and trade levels it is possible to make everyone better off under the 
free trade situation than under the autarky situation no matter what the initial free trade 
distribution of goods.  This is the sense in which it can be said that the policy of free trade is 
potentially welfare improving for a country compared to a policy of autarky.  For similar reasons, 
it can be said that a policy of imposing optimum tariffs is welfare improving compared to a 
policy of free trade.  However, free trade in the sense of the particular collection of goods 
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obtained under this policy is not potentially welfare improving compared to the particular 
collection of goods obtained under autarky.  The point utility possibility curves obtained in these 
cases may intersect.  
It seems to me that trade economists (but not Alan) too often fail to be clear that when 
they say free trade is better than autarky that they are talking about the policy of free trade and 
the policy of autarky and not the particular collection of goods obtained by following these 
policies.  
The last topic in Alan’s writings on the gains from trade and globalization that I want to 
discuss briefly is his interesting analysis of the making the rules of globalization in political 
economy terms.  He points out that corporations have played a significant role in formulating 
these rules in international organizations such as the GATT, the WTO and NAFTA.  For 
example, the stimulus to focus the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations on nontariff trade barriers 
came mainly from business interests.  Similarly, the political pressure to include trade related 
intellectual property rights as a negotiating subject in the Uruguay Round came mainly from the 
business sector.  We know from direct observation and assume in our economic models, that 
corporations are not interested in promoting general economic welfare but their rather own 
welfare, namely, profits.  As Alan points out, while economic theory is reassuring about the 
effects of the profit motive when it drives behavior in competitive marketplaces, there is no such 
reason to trust its effects in the political arena.  In short, there is no reason to expect the invisible 
hand to guide governments that are under the influence of corporations toward desirable 
outcomes in political markets.  
Alan cited two instances where he believes corporations have shaped the rules of 
globalization in a manner that increased their profits at the expense of the general public.  One is 
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the TRIPS agreement in the Uruguay Round and the other is Chapter 11 of NAFTA.  The TRIPS 
agreement requires all countries to enact and enforce intellectual property laws that are 
comparable to those that exist in developed countries.  This, in his view, is a change that can 
only benefit rich-country owners of intellectual property and harm poor-country consumers.   
Chapter 11 of NAFTA requires that any expropriation of the property of a foreign 
investor be accompanied by appropriate compensation.  What Alan finds particularly 
objectionable is that the victim of such expropriation can bring a case before a NAFTA tribunal 
against a national government of the country in which the expropriation took place.  Moreover, it 
seems that it is being used not just against direct expropriation but against governments 
whenever they introduce a policy or regulation that reduces a corporation’s profits.  Alan 
believes that both of these provisions go too far in giving corporations power over foreign 
governments, a conclusion with which I think most of us would agree.  Thus, I think that Alan’s 
broadening of his studies of the gains from trade and globalization to include investigations into 
the political economy of how the rules for globalization are determined is very worthwhile and 
encourage him and other economists to pursue this line of investigation further.   
References 
Deardorff, Alan V. “Fragmentation in Simple Trade Models,” North American Journal of 
Economics and Finance, 12, July 2001, pp. 121-137. 
 
_______________  “Fragmentation across Cones.” in SvenW. Arndt and Henryk Kierzkowski, 
eds., Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World Economy, Oxford University Press, 
2001, pp. 35-51. 
 
_______________.  “International Provision of Trade Services, Trade, and Fragmentation.” 
Review of International Economics 9, May 2001, pp. 233-248. 
 
______________.  “Trade and Welfare Implications of Networks.”  Journal of Economic 
Integration 16, December 2001, pp. 485-499. 
  6
______________. “What Might Globalization's Critics Believe?,” World Economy Lecture, 
December 5, 2002, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom. 
 
_____________. “Who Makes the Rules of Globalization”? prepared for a Globalization 
Workshop at the CESifo Venice Summer Institute, 2004, included in Elias Dinopoulos, Pravin 
Krishna, Arvind Panagariya, and Kar-yiu Wong, eds., Trade Globalization, and Poverty, 
Routledge, 2008, pp. 173-186. 
_____________. "A Trade Theorist's Take on Skilled-Labor Outsourcing", September 13, 2004. 
CV "Ricardian Comparative Advantage with Intermediate Inputs", Revised August 30, 2004. 
 
_____________. “Gains from Trade and Fragmentation”. Research Seminar in International 
Economics. Discussion Paper No. 543, July 2005. 
 
Deardorff, Alan V. and Robert M. Stern.  “What You Should Know about Globalization and the 
World Trade Organization”. Review of International Economics 10, August 2002, pp. 404-423. 
 
Deardorff, Alan V. and Robert M. Stern.  “Globalization’s Bystanders: Does Trade 
Liberalization Hurt Countries that Do Not Participate?” Paper prepared for the UNU/WIDER 
Project of The Impact of Globalizaation on the World’s Poor, Oct. 29-30, 2004, Helsinki. 
 
Jones, Ronald W. and Henryk Kierzkowski. 2001. “Globalization and the Consequences of 
International Fragmentation.”  In R. Dornbusch, G. Calvo, and M. Obstfeld, eds., Capital 
Mobility and Trade: Essays in Honor of Robert A. Mundell. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Rauch, James E. 2001. “Business and Social Networking in International Trade.” Journal of 
Economic Literature 39, pp. 1177-1203. 
 
Samuelson, Paul A. 1939. “The Gains from International Trade,” Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science 5, pp. 195-205. 
 









                                                 
* The author is at Columbia University and can be reached at ap2231@Columbia.Edu.  This paper 
is written in honor of leading trade economist Alan V. Deardorff for presentation at a conference 
to celebrate his 65th birthday at the university of Michigan, October 2-3, 2009.  
On Some Aspects of Globalization 
Arvind Panagariya 
In his wide-ranging World Economy Lecture, Alan Deardorff (2003) embarks 
upon a journey of the writings of globalization critics.  In the course of the journey, he 
identifies their complaints with which he agrees, those with which he disagrees but 
understands within the context of the standard trade models and those that do not fit the 
conventional theory.  In the latter case, he goes on to develop alternative models that may 
better capture the concerns of the critics.  In addition to his usual analytic clarity, rigor 
and originality, the lecture also brings to fore a most admirable characteristic of Alan’s 
personality: his eagerness to listen to the opposite view and, if persuaded by it, a 
willingness to modify his own thinking. For the benefit of his friends who may have 
missed reading this lecture, I can scarcely resist quoting from its concluding section: 
“In preparing for this talk, I read more than I ever had before of the writings of 
globalization critics, including several books and numerous items on the web. … 
“As I mentioned to colleagues along the way, I sometimes felt that I was 
brainwashing myself by reading the works of globalization critics.  Particularly, perhaps, 
because I was determined to keep an open mind to their point of view rather than 
constantly marshalling my economist’s presumptions against them, I found as I read that 
I too sometimes became appalled at the state of the world that they described.  I too 
sometimes easily accepted that it was globalization that had in some manner contributed 
to this situation. 
“In the end, what I realized was that my previous defensive posture towards the 
critics of globalization had perhaps prevented me from giving proper weight to the flaws 
in the world system that even defenders of globalization have long deplored.  I tended, 
before this, to dismiss those flaws as exceptional and to focus instead on much broader 
good that I thought globalization could do and had done.  The latter, I still think, was 
appropriate, but the flaws deserve attention too.” 
My objective in this short paper is to honor Alan by imitation, “the sincerest of 
flattery” in the immortal words of Charles Caleb Colton.  As in his lecture, I select a set 
of themes underlying the writings of globalization critics.  Given the scarcity of time and 
space, it is not possible to touch on all the themes Alan has covered in his World 
Economy Lecture and elsewhere.  Instead, I limit myself to issues relevant to developing 
countries—my current preoccupation—on which I have something new or different to 
say.   
1 Developed Country Protection and Subsidies in Agriculture 
Globalization critics have often pointed out that while preaching liberalization to the 
developing countries, developed countries have themselves retained high level of 
protection and subsidies in agriculture.  They not only accuse the developed countries of 
hypocrisy but also vehemently criticize them for hurting the poorest developing countries 
by driving down the prices of agricultural products in which the latter enjoy comparative 
advantage. Most economists embrace this criticism and gladly join the globalization 
critics in calling for the removal of agricultural protection and subsidies. 
Yet, as I discuss in Panagariya (2003, 2005), while tariffs and subsidies in 
agriculture deserve to be criticized and removed for their usual trade distorting effects, 
criticisms by globalization critics and some economists, most notably Stiglitz (2002), 
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focusing on the hypocrisy of developed countries and injury to the poorest countries are 
misplaced for at least four of reasons.   
First, regarding hypocrisy, the truth of the matter is that until the launch of the 
Uruguay Round, the developing countries themselves had no interest in market access in 
agriculture.  They sought to industrialize and therefore were focused on either import 
substitution or market access in industrial products, often through trade preferences rather 
than reciprocal bargaining in the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
rounds of multilateral negotiations. 
Second, in so far as the effects of the subsidies and protection are concerned, the 
facts are largely the other way around: they benefit rather than hurt the poorest countries.  
European tariffs and subsidies have the effect of driving down the world prices of most 
agricultural products and raising them internally within Europe.  Whether an outside 
country loses or benefits from this depends on whether it is an exporter or importer of 
agricultural products.  It turns out that an overwhelming majority of the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) is a net food importer and a significant majority is a net agricultural 
importer.  The decline in the world prices of agricultural products therefore benefits the 
majority of the LDCs at least at the national level.   
This point came to the fore recently when food inflation struck the world economy.  
Rather than celebrate the price hike as a boon to the fortunes of the poor countries, 
virtually all saw it as a curse for the poor countries.  There was near universal outrage 
that the poor countries suffered the most from food inflation!  
Third, once we take account of the trade preferences available to the LDCs in the 
European Union (EU) market, it can be shown that virtually all LDCs benefit from the 
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existing system of protection and subsidies.  Under the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
initiative, the EU permits the products of LDCs to be sold free of duty in its markets.  
This means the LDCs sell their exports at the high internal EU price and buy their 
imports at the low external, world market price.  On both counts, they benefit.  
Finally, agricultural protection is not purely a developed country phenomenon.  True, 
the Cairns Group developing countries have a comparative advantage and low protection 
in agriculture.  But many developing countries that are net importers do have high 
agricultural protection.  Recall that it was the Indian demand for a very generous special 
safeguard in agriculture that has been one of the important stumbling blocks to the 
conclusion of the Doha Round. 
Before I conclude this section, an objection to the above points as also an exception 
to which these points do not apply may be noted.  The objection is that even if the LDCs 
gain from the low world prices because they are net agricultural importers, the poor may 
be hurt because they must compete against the subsidized imports.  Deardorff (2003), 
who has clearly thought through this issue more deeply than most critics, clearly 
anticipates this point when he writes,  
“As a trade economist, I am fond of pointing out that in the aggregate such subsidies 
hurt the country whose government pays them and actually benefit the rest of the 
world.  And if the subsidies were in fact delivering affordable food to the world’s 
hungry, I would not mind them at all as long as they could be depended on to 
continue.  But in fact, as I understand it, most of the hungry in the developing 
countries are in rural areas where, instead of benefiting from this cheap food, they 
have to compete with it for livelihood.  In the long run, that may or may not be best 
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use of their labor, but in the short run these subsidies are simply driving small 
developing country farmers further into poverty.  That is inexcusable.” 
 But even this objection is subject to two qualifications.  First, in principle, the 
LDC farmers can access the internal EU price under the EBA.  Their competition is not 
with the subsidized external, world price but instead with the EU internal price.  Second, 
even if competition with the subsidized external price is a problem, the LDCs are far 
better off employing a countervailing duty on imports, which is entirely legal under the 
WTO rules.  Such duty would allow the LDCs to realize the higher price for their farmers 
while also contributing to their revenue kitties.  
The exception to the proposition that developed-country subsidies benefit the LDCs 
arises in the case of cotton.  As it turns out, the EU produces no cotton and therefore 
applies no subsidies and tariffs to it.  As a result, its internal cotton price equals the 
border cotton price and the EBA offers no relief to LDC exporters of the product.  The 
culprit in this case is the United States, which subsidizes cotton production and drives 
down its world price.  Four small West African countries are net exporters of the product 
and are hurt by the low price.  But even here, the subsidy benefits Bangladesh, which is a 
net importer of cotton.  Unsurprisingly, cotton is the only product cited as an example of 
rich country subsidies hurting the poor countries.  Even sugar turns out to be a mixed 
case. 
2 Intellectual Property Rights, Labor Standards and Rule Making 
The issue of geographical expansion of intellectual property right (IPR) protection to 
include all countries in the world has been another important contentious issue in recent 
years.  A key component of the Uruguay Round Agreement was the Agreement on Trade 
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Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which extended the 
approximate intellectual property protection standards in the United States to the entire 
world.  All countries except the LDCs were required to introduce these standards in their 
domestic laws latest by January 1, 2005.  The LDCs were given a temporary reprieve in 
pharmaceuticals sector but they too must introduce them by January 1, 2016.  
The key contentious element of TRIPS negotiations related to the extension of 20-
year patent protection to both process and product in the area of pharmaceuticals.  By 
maintaining a weak intellectual property regime that recognized only process patents, 
some developing countries, most notably India, had successfully created substantial 
indigenous low-cost medicine industry.  Local firms in these countries could alter the 
production process of medicines still under patent in the developed countries and sell the 
generic version so produced at a fraction of the price of the original medicines.  These 
countries opposed the extension of product patent in pharmaceuticals to them. 
Deardorff (1992) provides a formal model that brilliantly captures the sources of the 
tensions associated with the TRIPS negotiation.  The model hypothesizes a fixed cost of 
each medicine to be invented of which there are potentially numerous.  These medicines 
may be ranked based on their present value of the consumers’ surplus net of production 
costs and the cost of innovation.  Ideally, one will want all medicines with zero or 
positive net present value to be innovated and produced.  But since innovations are a 
public good they must be supported by either a government subsidy or patent protection.  
Because government subsidies bring their own problems, patent protection remains the 
principal viable practical option under most circumstances.  The social cost of patent 
protection is, of course, the monopoly distortion in the product market.  The patent gives 
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the innovator to sole right to manufacture and sell the medicine.  The longer the patent, 
the more medicines are innovated.  But the longer the patent, the higher the social cost of 
monopoly distortion in medicines that are innovated even under a shorter patent.  The 
optimal patent is the one that equates the gain from the last medicine innovated to the 
increased social cost of distortion on intra-marginal medicines.  It is evident that the 
optimal patent is finite.  For producers, a longer patent is almost always better than a 
shorter patent since it gives them monopoly rights for a longer period.  The consumers 
must weigh the benefits from additional innovation on the margin against the monopoly 
cost incurred on the intra-marginal medicines.  
The tension between costs and benefits, which arises when the patent is extended 
over time, also arises when it is extended in space.  When the intellectual property 
protection of a given length of time is extended to another country, it brings more 
innovation on the margin but it also extends the monopoly distortion in all existing 
innovations to that country.  Such extension may or may not be beneficial from the global 
welfare viewpoint.  Even if it is beneficial, it will turn harmful as we keep adding more 
and more countries.  If innovating firms are concentrated in the countries already covered 
by the patent and the newly included country is relatively poor so that the beneficial 
impact on new innovations is minimal, the former gain while the latter loses. 
This simple Deardorff model of intellectual property protection neatly brings out all 
the tensions at work in extending intellectual property rights to the poor countries: 
pharmaceutical firms acquire the right to collect royalties in the poor countries, 
developed countries that do much of the innovation also benefit and the poor countries 
stand to lose since they losing royalty-free access to patented medicines. 
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The only possible source of significant gain to the poor countries is the possibility 
that the patent would stimulate innovation in medicines specifically relevant to them such 
as those relating to malaria and tuberculosis.  But even this gain will fail to materialize, as 
has been the case so far, if the purchasing power in the poor countries is insufficient to 
support the research necessary to innovate the medicines.  This is likely to be the case 
since the initial cost of research in an area in which pharmaceutical companies have not 
been engaged before are likely to be large while the ability to pay for medicines in the 
poor countries is likely to be small. 
The central theme of Alan’s World Economy Lecture is that globalization critics 
view globalization as benefiting corporations and hurting workers.  Deardorff (2008) 
picks up this theme and develops the idea that a key avenue through which corporations 
exploit the globalization process to their advantage is through rule writing.  In this latter 
paper, he offers the TRIPS Agreement as an example of rule writing by corporations. 
There is no doubt that the United States pharmaceutical firms were the key driving 
force behind pushing and perhaps even drafting some of the language of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  By extending the patent protection to the developing countries, these firms 
stood to reap extra rents on the innovations they would have undertaken anyway to serve 
the developed country markets.  They also had the necessary political muscle to get the 
United States Trade Representative to negotiate the desired agreement on their behalf. 
Nevertheless, it was perhaps the north-south rather than capital-labor tension that 
dominated rule writing in the TRIPS negotiations.  Benefits from the TRIPS Agreement 
were to accrue to the United States pharmaceutical firms not so much at the expense of 
the United States labor or labor anywhere for that matter as the developing country 
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consumers.  The corporations could exercise their muscle in the TRIPS negotiations 
principally because the United States government was backing them up.  And the 
counterweight to the corporations was provided not be the United States or other 
countries’ labor lobbies but, instead, the developing country governments. 
As it turns out, at least as of now, the AFL-CIO (2008) officially supports the pursuit 
of intellectual property protection in the international trade negotiations.  A statement by 
the Executive Council of the organization dated March 4, 2008 explicitly endorses this 
position.  To quote from this statement, “The AFL-CIO has worked to ensure that 
intellectual property protection is pursued as a key component of our international trade 
agenda. Foreign intellectual property rights infringement robs the U.S. of tens of billions 
of dollars in sales, with the resulting loss of jobs and income for America’s workers.” 
Indeed, asymmetry in the negotiating power in favor of the United States gives all of 
its powerful lobbies greater clout in rule writing than their developing country 
counterparts.  The AFL-CIO support for the pursuit of intellectual property rights 
protection is not an accident.  They want to gain the same benefit from rule writing for 
workers as corporations at the expense of the developing countries.  As a result, they 
have made common cause with corporations and sought their support for extending U.S. 
labor standards to the developing countries.  While they remain some ways from 
achieving this goal in the WTO, they have made significant progress in the free trade area 
(FTA) negotiations with small southern countries that have virtually no negotiating 
power vis-à-vis the United States.  The process of labor groups jumping into rule writing 
had already begun in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) when the 
Clinton administration insisted on a side agreement on labor rights before giving it final 
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approval.  Subsequently, the labor clauses have been a central element of FTA agreement 
signed by the United States. 
In a similar vein, it is the north-south rather than capital-labor dimension of rule 
writing that provided the counterforce to the promotion of corporate interests in the Doha 
negotiations.  Driven by its corporations, the EU had strongly pushed for a multilateral 
investment agreement in the Doha negotiating agenda.  But a more or less united 
offensive by the developing countries forced it to withdraw this demand immediately 
following the 2003 WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun.  While corporations have thus 
used rule writing to advance their interests as globalization proceeds, northern labor has 
not been too far behind.  In both cases, the counterweight has come from the developing 
countries that too have learned the importance of rule writing and actively participate in 
the process.  
3 Third-country Effects of Trade Liberalization 
An important policy question is how non-discriminatory trade liberalization among 
developed countries impacts developing countries.  The specific context is the 
multilateral liberalization prior to the Uruguay Round Agreement that was confined to 
developed countries.  Most developing countries eschewed active participation in the 
negotiations until the Uruguay Round, choosing to benefit from free riding the developed 
country liberalization.  Was this a wise choice? 
Deardorff and Stern (2003) provide a neat theoretical analysis of this question, 
answering it in the negative.  They use a multi-product, multi-country political economy 
model with additively separable preferences, a constant marginal utility from the 
consumption of the numeraire good and production functions that allow one specific 
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factor and one common factor in all non-numeraire goods and only the common factor in 
the numeraire good.  This model has the property that all substitution in production as 
well as consumption is between individual non-numeraire goods and the numeraire good.  
Alternatively put, it fully validates the partial equilibrium analysis, allowing welfare 
conclusions to be drawn from the sum of the consumers’ and producers’ surplus and tax 
revenue. 
The political economy component of the model postulates that liberalization is 
driven solely by producer profits.  This is not a necessary assumption but it suffices to 
obtain the key results while simplifying the analysis.  In this setting, it is straightforward 
that developed countries choose not to liberalize any product exported exclusively by the 
developing countries.  Such liberalization produces no benefits for producers in the 
developed countries undertaking liberalization.  On the other hand, goods exported 
exclusively by developed countries are most likely to be liberalized.  In so far as such 
liberalization expands within-developed-country trade, it is likely to divert supplies from 
developing countries.  This will raise the price paid by the developing countries for these 
products or, equivalently, worsen their terms of trade.  This benefits developed country 
producers.  Therefore, the countries have an incentive to liberalize trade in products in 
which they are able to expand their mutual trade by diverting it from developing 
countries.  The action will hurt the developing countries.  
Most trade economists will appreciate the message underlying this conclusion: 
developing countries choose to stay out of the negotiating process at their own peril.  
Nevertheless, I suspect that the outcome in the real world is somewhat different: 
developing countries that are themselves keen to take advantage of the opportunities 
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offered by trade and chose to be open on a unilateral basis probably benefited from 
developed country trade liberalization via the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds.  It is 
inconceivable that South Korea and Taiwan did not benefit from the liberalization by 
developed countries in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The Deardorff-Stern model obtains its strong conclusion by choosing a model in 
which it is possible to force liberalization from spilling over to the outside countries 
despite the Most Favored Nation (MFN) nature of liberalization.  I suspect that in 
practice this is not possible.  Liberalization within the GATT-WTO system must follow a 
tariff nomenclature that does not allow product categories to be defined according to the 
origin.  This fact combined with the observation that in reality countries source most 
products from both developed and developing countries makes it nearly impossible to 
avoid spillover of developed country liberalization to developing countries.   
We know from the recent work of Schott (2004) that even as we go down to the 10-
digit products within the harmonized tariff system, we observe the United States 
continuing to import a very large number of products from both developed and 
developing countries.1  Typically, the former send overwhelmingly high-unit-value 
varieties and the latter low-unit-value varieties of the same product.  This pattern makes 
the exclusion of developing countries from developed country liberalization envisaged in 
the Stern-Deardorff model highly unlikely. 
 An early study by Michael Finger (1976) confirms the favorable trade effects of 
the Kennedy Round on the developing countries: it concluded that ‘tariff cuts of each 
importer (EEC, United States, Japan) caused a significant increase of imports, from 
developing and from other developed countries.’  A more recent study by Romalis (2007) 
                                                 
1 Also see Mukerji and Panagariya (2009) in this context. 
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finds very strong growth effects of the opening up of the developed countries via the 
Kennedy Round on the developing countries.   
 Before I conclude this section, let me hasten to add that in one sense my points 
reinforces the underlying message of Deardorff and Stern: only countries that are 
themselves open will reap the benefits of liberalization by developed countries.  
Therefore, the qualifications to the Deardorff-Stern analysis I have put forward do not in 
any way undermine their key message: it pays to be open.  And in so far as participation 
in multilateral negotiations leads to the opening up of one’s own economy, such 
participation can only enhance the scope for benefiting from developed country 
liberalization. 
4 Corporations and Globalization  
Given the central focus on the role played by corporations in the process of 
globalization in Alan’s writings, it is appropriate to end by asking whether he regards 
them as a positive or negative force on balance.  The answer in Deardorff (2003, p. 657) 
is refreshingly unequivocal and worthy of reproduction in near entirety: 
“Perhaps more than most economists, I am personally predisposed to see 
corporations as beneficial to the society.  It seems obvious to me that corporations 
have made possible a level of well-being throughout most of the world that far 
exceeds what could have been achieved without them.  The invisible hand of the 
market only partly accounts for this, since large corporations clearly have far more 
power over markets than we assume in our competitive models.  But as long as these 
large corporations are forced to compete with one another and also with small new 
entrants that may at any moment emerge – a level of competition that requires the 
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active vigilance and sometimes enforcement by government competition authorities 
– I have no doubt but that they do far more good than harm for the vast majority of 
the world’s population.  And indeed, within the markets in which they operate, 
corporations are much more vulnerable to public opinion and therefore powerless 
than is often thought.” 
The history of economic policies in India, which I have discussed in detail in my 
recent book (Panagariya 2008), lends a great deal of support to Alan’s view.  Motivated 
by fears of the concentration of wealth in the hands of corporations, India went on to tie 
their hands (and feet too!) in the 1960s and 1970s in ways that will be incomprehensible 
to Americans.  The result was growth at a pace that was considerably below the country’s 
potential.  Eventual restoration of the freedom of corporations to operate in a business-
friendly environment has led to dramatic improvements in the well being of many within 
a relatively short span of time with poverty at last declining significantly as well. 
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 The general equilibrium analysis of gains from international trade is necessarily a high-
dimensioned and complex undertaking. While the workhorse 2x2x2 model so elegantly 
developed by Ron Jones and others offers many insights, when it comes to the matter of offering 
policy advice, it is impossible to avoid moving to higher dimensions. Whether this involves 
disaggregating the “rest of world” to permit analysis of bilateral trade agreements, capturing 
differential tariff treatment of intermediate inputs employed in export industries, or 
disaggregating factors of production to discern the distributional impacts of trade policy reform, 
policy-oriented economists are inevitably called upon to move beyond the dimensions that are 
tractable in purely analytical models. This has spawned a growth industry in the supply of 
computational analyses for international trade policy. 
 However, computational partial and general equilibrium (CPE and CGE) analyses of 
trade are often discounted by the academic community. Such models are referred to 
disparagingly as “black boxes”, papers based on computational models are often discounted out 
of hand, and they are rarely published in the leading journals of international economics. Indeed, 
I expect that the majority of presenters in this symposium today would discourage their students 
from doing computational work during their graduate studies. It is a sad state of affairs when 
economic policy advisors are demanding more computational analysis even as the best and 
brightest in our community are supplying less of this very same product, leaving the bulk of 
computational work to be done by others – largely those outside of academia.  
 Fortunately, there are a few academic trade economists who have swum against this tide 
of intellectual purity, striving to link rigorous theory with computational analysis of important 
policy questions. Alan Deardorff is one of these few, and I am extremely honored to have the 
opportunity to celebrate his contributions to the computational analysis of trade policy. 
 
 
The Planning-Feedback Approach to Computational Trade Modeling 
In the two Deardorff-Stern (1986 and 1990) books documenting the first two decades of 
development of the Michigan trade model and some of its major applications, the authors 
describe “the curious and cumbersome process of informed trial and error by which we have 
used numerical models to grope toward an understanding of both theory and reality.” They 
divide this process into two distinct parts, the planning phase and the feedback phase. Here, a 
quotation from the 1986 volume is in order: 
Only the first of these phases, which we shall call the planning phase, shows up clearly in the 
finished product. Yet it is the second phase, the feedback phase, that yields most of the insights 
that we shall discuss….. It is their interaction that we have found fascinating and informative 
over the years of working with the model, much more so than the ultimate numerical answers to 
the particular problems we set out to solve (Deardorff and Stern, 1986, p. 220). 
 
In my own reading of Alan Deardorff’s contributions to computational trade analysis, I have 
found these discoveries, motivated by the feedback process, to be especially intriguing and 
worthy of note by theorists and applied trade economists alike. I believe both groups could 
benefit from being “more like Alan” in their attention to this feedback phase of model 
development. Therefore, permit me to consider three such examples. (I’m sure there are more, 
but these are three salient illustrations that I was able to discern from a distance.) 
The Factor Content of Trade: The first example of highly productive feedback from 
computational analysis of practical policy issues to theoretical trade insights is offered by Robert 
Staiger, a former Deardorff student, now on the faculty at Stanford University. (I took the liberty 
of contacting a number of Alan’s former students while preparing this paper.) Staiger’s work 
came to my attention because he appeared as an author on two papers in 1988: one, a 
computational paper in The Review of Economics and Statistics, and one a theoretical paper in 
2 
 
the Journal of International Economics. Both papers seek to answer the question whether we can 
infer something useful about the effects of trade on relative factor prices from our knowledge of 
the factor content of trade. Based on personal correspondence with Professor Staiger, the 
computational paper came first. Indeed, it was the presentation of an early version of this paper 
on the factor content of trade at an NBER conference which precipitated both publications.  
According to Staiger, at the NBER workshop, Gene Grossman raised the question of 
whether one could make inferences about the impact of trade on factor prices from the factor 
content of trade. Staiger and Deardorff returned to Michigan and started with a blank sheet of 
paper and a simple theoretical model aimed a proving this link. This gave rise to the JIE paper in 
which Deardorff and Staiger establish a positive correlation between relative changes in the 
factor content of trade and proportional changes in factor prices. Indeed, under a more restrictive 
set of assumptions about production and utility functions, the factor content of trade provides an 
accurate measure of the relative effects of trade on individual factor returns. Meanwhile the 
RESTAT paper, which developed in parallel to the theory paper, brought these theoretical 
insights to bear in an analysis of the relative impact of Japanese and US tariffs on factor markets 
in those two countries (Staiger, Deardorff and Stern, 1988). Without the interplay between theory 
and computational analysis, these two papers would not have been published. 
The Love of Variety: With the advent of the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz CES, love of variety 
utility function, and its introduction in the trade context by Paul Krugman, this formulation of 
consumer demand has become pervasive in the trade literature. However, this specification also 
puts a great burden on the constant elasticity of substitution in that function, for it must 
determine both the price elasticity of demand – and hence the optimal markup – as well as 
consumers’ love of variety (LoV) – and therefore the gains from product proliferation. While 
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initially introduced into consumer demand, Ethier suggested using this specification for 
modeling firms’ derived demands, and the cost reductions from added variety became a key 
element of the gains from trade liberalization (Romer, 1994). Thus the incorporation of scale 
economies and the love of variety became a natural extension of the Michigan model (Brown, 
Deardorff and Stern, 1992a,b).  
However there was a problem. When confronted with real world data, in which the vast 
majority of trade is in intermediate inputs, the standard CES love of variety cost function led to 
extreme model instability. Consider the case of a reduction in tariffs on intermediate inputs 
utilized in a domestic industry. In the absence of love of variety, this leads to a cost reduction 
and expansion of the industry, but this expansion is curtailed by rising factor prices and the 
model finds a new equilibrium at a higher level of output. However, product differentiation by 
firm and love of variety is added to this picture, the reduction in costs also leads to firm entry. 
When such entry occurs in input-supplying industries, this expanded product variety contributes 
to further cost reductions, additional entry and so on. For this reason CGE models with the CES 
LoV specification are prone to far greater specialization than observed in reality (Brown, 
Deardorff and Stern, 1995). 
This problem was first confronted by Drusilla Brown (personal communication) when 
working on the application of the Michigan model to an analysis of trade reforms in Tunisia. She 
was unable to get the model to solve and called Alan Deardorff to vent her frustrations. Alan 
responded by proposing a modification of the standard Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz, CES specification 
in which another parameter explicitly governing agents’ LoV, is introduced. This parameter, let’s 
call it β, is bounded between zero and one and produces both the Krugman-style trade model (β 
= 1) and the Armington model (no love of variety) (β = 0) as special cases. When Drusilla asked 
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Alan for a suggestion on the value to assign this parameter, he suggested 0.5. (As we will see 
momentarily, this turns out to be a remarkably prescient choice!) This indeed solved Brown’s 
convergence problem, and she was able to complete the project successfully. Meanwhile this 
new LoV parameter became embedded in the Michigan model.1  
A few years later, I was attempting a large scale, disaggregated application of the CES-
LoV model within the GTAP modeling framework at Purdue University, and ran0 across the 
same problem of model instability. After scratching my head for awhile, I contacted Drusilla to 
inquire about her experience, whereupon she related to me Alan’s suggested model revision. It 
worked like a charm! Of course, this left open the question of what the appropriate value of the 
LoV parameter might be, which brings us to the remarkable conclusion of this tale of the 
“feedback” phase of model development.  
In 2003, Adina Ardelean, a student of David Hummels (another Deardorff/Michigan 
connection in this story), took my graduate class in computational trade modeling at Purdue 
University. Her work on CGE analysis of trade policy in this course got her interested in 
Deardorff’s modified LoV specification and she developed this into her doctoral dissertation. In 
addition to working out the theoretical properties of this model, she came up with an innovative 
approach to estimating the LoV parameter (Ardelean, 2009).  I recommend this paper to you. For 
the purposes at hand, suffice it to say that Adina’s global trade-weighted mean estimate of the 
LoV parameter is 0.54 (with a standard deviation of 0.13) -- remarkably close to Alan’s initial 
intuitive estimate of β = 0.5. I find this to be an excellent example of the feedback phase in 
which computational analysis is iterated with theoretical (and econometric) work to produce an 
improved model of the way international trade really works. 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that Benassy (1996) published a paper about the same time, exploring the implications of 
deviations from the CES-LoV specification for the optimal number of varieties in an economy. It appears that these 
developments were fully independent discoveries. 
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Protection and Real Wages: One of the oldest questions in international trade pertains to 
the impact of trade liberalization on real wages. The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem represents a 
milestone in this literature, stating that a tariff cut would decrease the real wage of a country’s 
scarce factor of production. In the 1990’s, the question of the likely wage impacts of trade policy 
reform loomed large in the NAFTA debate – a policy debate in which the Michigan Model 
played an important role. In the context of this debate, it was assumed that real wages in the US 
– a labor scarce country – would likely fall in the face of tariff cuts. However, the Michigan 
Model results for NAFTA produced the opposite result: real wages rose (Brown, Deardorff and 
Stern, 1992a,b). In a subsequent paper, Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1993) explain how this 
phenomenon can arise. In so doing, they extend the Stopler-Samuelson Theorem to an 
environment with scale economies, imperfect competition and product differentiation. In this 
context, increased scale of production, reduced markups and varietal gains can all work against 
the traditional Stopler-Samuelson effect, giving rise to an outcome where real wages of the 
scarce factor of production rise with tariff reductions. 
This last example nicely illustrates a further discussion of the feedback phase of model 
development from Deardorff and Stern (1986): 
What typically happened when we solved the model was that we found something unexpected in 
the results. Sometimes the results were just nonsense and we had to go back and find out why. 
More often the results were plausible overall but contained one or two features that we did not 
expect in terms of either direction or size of the effect. (E.g., the real wage impacts of NAFTA.) 
The feedback phase of  model construction consists of examining the assumptions of the model 
carefully until such surprises can be explained, and then either modifying the model or 
modifying our ideas of what to expect so that the results are no longer surprising. Either way, 




Other Important Contributions 
 While there is not sufficient space to develop all of Alan Deardorff’s contributions to 
CGE analysis of trade policy (and I need to leave some material for my fellow panelists), I would 
like to highlight a few more things which are important and notable about the Deardorff-Stern 
work. Their focus on short run labor market impacts provided policy makers with highly relevant 
information about the likely impacts of trade reform on employment by industry. They also were 
ahead of their time in seeking to come to grips with non-tariff barriers as well as trade in 
services, both of which have now (two decades later) moved front and center in the global trade 
policy landscape.  
 As his career progressed, the focus of Alan Deardorff’s computational work shifted 
increasingly to developing country impacts of trade policy. Of special note is his long term 
collaboration with Rajesh Chadha and Sanjib Pohit, as well as Robert Stern, on the CGE analysis 
of domestic policy reforms in India. The ensuing model, documented in Chadha et al. (1998) 
represented an innovative approach to CGE modeling of an economy with significant elements 
of state monopoly and administered pricing. 
 As a direct result of his willingness to engage with policy makers in the messy world of 
computational trade policy analysis, Alan Deardorff has also become a much sought after advisor 
on issues relating to the multilateral trading system, undertaking numerous projects with the US 
government, the United Nations agencies, the World Bank, and others.  
 
Future Directions for Computational Analysis of International Trade 
 Alan Deardorff was a pioneer in the computational analysis of international trade. As was 
the case with other pioneers in this field, he had to be a jack of all trades. In addition to writing 
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down the theory of the model, he also wrote the FORTRAN code necessary for its numerical 
implementation. Implementation of the Michigan Model required him to develop clever 
techniques for partitioning the numerical model and solution strategies that permitted him to 
solve models that were exceptionally large, by the standards of the time. He and Bob Stern were 
also required to develop globally consistent data sets, and had to worry about obtaining sensible 
parameters for their model. In short, this was a lot of ground to cover before actually getting to 
the point where results could be generated. Fortunately for those coming later to this field, there 
have been some important institutional advances which have lowered the entry barriers to this 
field, while simultaneously enhancing the credibility of such work in policy circles.  
More specifically, the advent of the publicly available, regularly updated Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) data base has removed one of the biggest barriers to CGE analysis of 
trade policy. And as the community of CGE modelers has grown, so too has the software 
industry servicing the computational needs of this group. The GAMS and GEMPACK software 
packages have greatly enhanced the efficiency of computational modelers, while also making it 
much easier to replicate the work of others. Indeed, as the CGE (and CPE) analysis of trade 
policies moves forward, the availability of libraries of alternative models and policy analyses 
will prove increasingly important. The only way to overcome the black-box critique of these 
models is to permit others to readily replicate, critique and extend published work. I encourage 
everyone serving as a reviewer on a CGE or CPE journal submission to require such submissions 
to be accompanied by an archive permitting the reviewer and/or future readers to easily replicate 
all of the findings in the paper. Without such replication, computational studies will remain little 
more than one-off exercises with limited potential for longer term, scientific impact. 
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 As with the efforts by Deardorff and Stern to bring to bear elements of the Krugman 
model of international trade within their computational framework, future research in this field 
must be on the lookout for promising new theoretical innovations. Prime among such 
innovations currently available are the Melitz-style models of producer heterogeneity (Melitz, 
2003; the appearance of Marc Melitz at this point provides yet another Deardorff/Michigan 
connection in this story). Early attempts to incorporate heterogeneous firms into a global CGE 
model (e.g., Zhai, 2008) suggest that this captures an element of trade policy reform long held by 
practitioners to be important – namely the impact on industry total factor productivity. CGE 
models with heterogeneous producers also open the way for incorporation of additional empirical 
characteristics of specific industries which are amenable to measurement – namely the 
distribution of firm-level productivities in a given industry. Indeed, some CGE analyses suggest 
that these productivity distribution parameters may be more important than the time-worn 
elasticities of substitution in trade which have hitherto governed the overall size of trade gains.  
 The revolution in empirical trade which has occurred over the past two decades also 
offers a great opportunity for computational analysis. This econometric work, coupled with 
systematic sensitivity analysis with respect to the estimated parameter distributions, gives CGE 
modelers the opportunity for the first time to put serious confidence intervals on their findings 
(e.g., Hertel, Hummels, et al., 2007). And recent estimates of the relative importance of the 
extensive and intensive margins of trade expansion (Hummels and Klenow, 2005) have proven 
critical for calibrating new CGE models of international trade (Zhai, 2008). There is also scope 
for statistically testing competing models of international trade for specific industries (Villoria, 
2009). Despite all the noise to the contrary, econometricians studying international trade and 
computational modelers are natural partners. The latter are typically addressing critical policy 
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issues, but are challenged as to the validity of their models. Meanwhile the former are often 
congratulated on the quality of their estimates, but they are faced at the end of the day with the 
question: Who cares? Greater cross-fertilization between these two groups can yield significant 
gains from trade.  
 In closing, I would like to call attention to the increasing role for trade economists in the 
debate over global environmental policy. The national impacts of climate change will hinge 
critically on the capability of a smoothly functioning global trading system to even out the 
differential regional impacts of climate change. Meanwhile, the policies aimed at mitigating 
climate change are likely tosignificantly alter the global pattern of comparative advantage, 
thereby creating new pressures for protectionism, as well as new potential gains from trade. In 
some cases, national environmental policies – specifically U.S. renewable fuel mandates -- are 
being written in such a way that their impacts through the global trading system must also be 
taken into account. Even more so than for trade policy, the world of global environmental policy 
relies heavily on computational models. Indeed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
maintains a library of results from 22 Global Circulation Models (the CMIP3 project) upon 
which scientists regularly draw to publish scholarly works. If trade economists wish to have an 
impact on these important deliberations, they, will have to “get their hands dirty” in the world of 
computational modeling. As Alan Deardorff has shown over the past three decades, there is great 
scope for trade theorists, working in conjunction with computational modelers, to contribute – 
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1. The third way 
Congratulations to Alan Deardorff on a long and distinguished research career that has 
shown great breadth as well as depth.  It is a pleasure to be here and participate in these events.  I 
am honored to be invited given that I have never worked with Alan and that our research 
interests have been rather different.  Yet in spite of the latter, I have great admiration for the 
things Alan has done and accomplished.   
 
I have been asked to offer some thoughts on Alan’s work on applied general-equilibrium 
modeling and indeed this is an area where our interests have a different focus.  Alan and the 
Michigan group used the computer and computational tools for policy simulations, working 
through the horrible task of calibrating these models to real data.  I have used simulations more 
as an extension of my theoretical tool kit, attacking problems that have too many dimensions, too 
many non-linearities, or too many inequality constraints to be tractable with our traditional 
analytical techniques.   To be honest, my knowledge of the difficulties involved in data work and 
calibration programs was in good measure why I did not go the same route.  But that indeed 
makes the Michigan group’s accomplishments much appreciated by myself. 
 
The basic theme of my comments is that applied-general-equilibrium (AGE) modeling 
represents a “third way” of doing economics, complementing the more traditional methods of 
analytical theory and econometrics.   Most of us at this conference were schooled only in the 
latter two methodologies and, worryingly, that limitation generally persists to this day.  This is in 
spite of the fact that analytical theory, “pencil and paper” theory if you like, and econometrics 
have limitations that prevent us from analyzing or even asking certain important questions.   I 
shall argue a bit later that in fact some traditional theorists and econometricians have been 
hostile to calibrated modeling and simulations and make that clear to their graduate students.   I 
have never understood this point of view, and see simulation modeling as an excellent 
complement to our other techniques. 
 
I am going to offer some praise and support for simulation modeling in the comments 
that follow, and also offer some criticism of the critics.  When I do this, please keep in mind that 
this is not really my field at all: I don’t want to be dismissed as merely touting my own research 
agenda.  Most of my thirty-seven year career has been as a pencil-and-paper theorist, and more 
recently I have also been a co-author with competent econometricians.  My own publications 
constructing and using calibrated models with real data amount to three papers. 
2. Limitations of traditional analytical theory 
As I just noted, I have spent the bulk of my career doing analytical theory; I continue to 
work primarily in this direction and place great value on the discipline of this approach and on 
the value of its insights.   But I believe that this approach has sharp boundaries and limitations, 
and that the computer is an excellent research tool to push back these boundaries. 
 
A first limitation of the analytical approach to theory is that it generally offers no 




learning in graduate school about the optimal tariff.  Well, it turns out it is not an optimal tariff 
number, it is an optimal tariff formula.  It is a very complicated general-equilibrium effect even 
in the very simple 2x2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin model, where it involves elasticities of substitution in 
both production sectors and in consumption, country sizes and so forth.  No one has a clue what 
its numerical magnitude might be, and analytical theory cannot even solve for it in terms of 
underlying numerical magnitudes of structural parameters.   
 
A second example is gains from trade liberalization.  Analytical theory gives us a gains-
from-trade theorem for moving from autarky to free (or restricted) trade, but little else, and even 
in the case of autarky to free trade there is of course no quantitative estimate of what the size of 
gains might be.  In realistic cases of second best liberalization scenarios, trade theory has 
virtually nothing to say.  But gains from trade is in fact a crucial question that policy makers 
need estimates about.  I have long observed a tendency for trade economists to invariably assure 
policy makers and journalists that trade liberalization is always and everywhere a good thing.  In 
fact, our theory says no such thing.   
 
To put this on a more general level, analytical methods have no ability to analyze 
complex comparative statics, generally not even with respect to qualitative properties except in 
extremely special cases.   There are several different problems, often coming together in bundles. 
The first is dimensionality: large numbers of equations and unknowns often defy analytical 
methods.  The second difficulty is that the equations are typically non-linear in our theories and 
thirdly, there is often complex simultaneity (meaning no simple recursive structure for example). 
  
The next difficulty is that in most reasonable general-equilibrium situations the “true” 
model is actually a set of non-linear inequalities instead of equations.  The actual model we 
would like to solve includes the possibility of many corner solutions and slack activities.  These 
models are termed non-linear complementarity problems in mathematical programming 
terminology: each non-linear inequality has an associated or complementary non-negative 
variable.  The classic simple supply and demand problem has in fact three possible equilibria in 
two unknowns, price and quantity.  (1) there is an interior equilibrium with both variables 
positive, (2) supply can lie entirely above demand so the equilibrium quantity is zero (production 
is unprofitable), and (3) supply can lie entirely to the right of demand so that the price is zero (it 
is a free good).  Traditional methods have difficulty even with this very simple case. 
 
The traditional way around this is to simplify the problem down to the point in which it is 
analytically tractable.  In my probably unpopular view, this often leads to extremely unrealistic 
assumptions that “throw the baby out with the bathwater.”  The interesting features of the 
problem are assumed away!  I have heard or read many presentations in which I find a very odd 
assumption or two.  When I then try to figure out the reason for this oddity, I often as not find 
that without the offending assumption the entire paper falls apart, meaning that the results don’t 
hold or that the model can no longer be solved analytically.  
 
Let me give three quick examples of over-used constructions in trade theory, chosen for 




Heckscher-Ohlin model, generally inconsistent with stylized facts about political economy.  (2) 
the large-group monopolistic-competition model, inconsistent with growing firm size and falling 
markups as the world economy grows and liberalizes.  (3) quasi-linear preference and the 
reliance on an “outside” good so common in the industrial-organization approach to trade theory, 
inconsistent with the high income-elasticities of demand for the goods in question. 
 
There is nothing wrong with starting in these places, the sin is in finishing there.  As I 
will propose later, start with a simple analytical case for insight and then simulate the model you 
really believe in.  One of my favorite quotes along these lines is the following: 
 
“Many branches of both pure and applied mathematics are in great need of 
computing instruments to break the present stalemate created by the failure of the 
purely analytical approach to nonlinear problems.” 
 
--- John Von Neumann, 1945 
 
Yup, 1945, and yet there is still considerable resistance in our field to this very basic 
observation and truth 64 years later. 
3. Disconnect between AGE modeling and econometrics 
I have virtually no expertise in this area and thus I will try to be brief and not discredit 
myself.   My view is that calibrated AGE modeling (calibrators) and econometrics (estimators) 
have different objectives, and critical comments made by one camp or the other are sometimes 
irrelevant and missing the point.  Estimators doing trade are interested in estimating the 
parameters involved in important relationships suggested by theory.  To continue my Heckscher-
Ohlin example, an estimator may restrict the parameter space by imposing the HO assumptions 
that countries have identical technologies, identical, homothetic preferences, and no domestic 
distortions and then estimate the contribution of endowment differences across countries to 
trade.  Results give an “average” response of trade to endowment changes. There are positive 
degrees of freedom, standard errors, and measures of how good the HO model fits the data 
 
 Calibrators are interested in the counter-factuals and have no reason to believe the HO 
model is “true”: countries surely have different technologies, tastes, endowments, and domestic 
distortions.  Their assumption is that the observed data (once made micro-consistent) represent 
an equilibrium, and the (endogenous) parameter space is expanded until the data fits the model 
exactly.  So, for example, countries are allowed to have Hicks-neutral differences in technology 
which “soak up” the error terms in the estimator’s equations.  There are no standard errors or 
degrees of freedom by assumption.  Obviously, estimators point to the lack of standard errors 
and degrees of freedom with enthusiasm, and I think calibrators are well aware of these issues.   
But I surely don’t want to get into this debate here.   
As in the case of analytical methods, it seems to me that traditional econometrics has 
difficulties in assessing complex general-equilibrium counter-factuals.  One of the areas where 




from complex regional trade agreements.  A few years ago, I heard a prominent empirical trade 
economist give an excellent survey on all of the recent empirical work on international trade 
issues.  When he finished, a questioner asked “what about gains from trade.”  The answer was 
that econometricians don’t do that, and that it is the province of applied general-equilibrium 
modelers.  But as mentioned above, this is surely one of the crucial things that policy makers 
want to know about before going into complex and lengthy negotiations.  In the case of NAFTA 
negotiations, econometric findings based on past multi-lateral liberalization (and at which time 
Mexico was a very small economy) were not very useful or appropriate in assessing this counter-
factual. 
 
To be more constructive, I think applied general-equilibrium models are useful for 
complementing both theory and empirical branches of economic science.  Models calibrated to 
real data for use in policy simulations pick up where econometrics leaves off, and econometrics 
has a crucial role in estimating elasticities and other parameters that go into the models.  I have 
never seen a conflict here and have had a hard time understanding the negative attitude of some 
traditionalists.   
 
Simulation of theory models with too many dimensions, two many non-linearities and/or 
too many inequalities to permit analytical solutions is surely a very worthwhile practice.  Again, 
I am in no way criticizing the use of analytical models simple enough to solve; that would, after 
all, be trashing my own career.  I just don’t want to stop there as I have indicated above.  In 
short, I strongly believe that simulation modeling is a complement to traditional theory and 
empirical methods, and we should embrace that complementarity in our own work and in our 
graduate teaching. 
4. Acknowledgment of early contributors to the development of simulation modeling 
Going back starting a couple of decades ago, the Stroh’s - Labatt’s region, as we use to 
call it, was a world leader in the development of applied general-equilibrium modeling.  Over on 
the Michgan (Stroh’s) side we had the Michigan model with Brown, Deardorff and Stern.  Over 
on the Ontario side (Labatt’s), we had John Whalley and assistants and graduate students that the 
rest of us at UWO referred to as “Whalley World,” and we had Richard Harris at Queen’s.  
 
Not doing this type of large-scale calibrated modeling, I really am in no position to 
comment in details about the many developments that are credited to the Michigan group, but I 
know they were path-breaking and hope that my colleagues in this session will comment in more 
detail.   I do believe that the Michigan group, along with Richard Harris, were pioneers at 
incorporating industrial-organization features into AGE models.   Based on being a colleague of 
John Whalley for fifteen years, I can tell you that I have immense respect for what these early 
modelers went through in the late 1970s and 1980.  Many a day we saw John with bags under his 
eyes having spent most of the night in the computer center where he would book out the VAX 
for six or so hours at a time in order to do a couple of runs of a 167 sector model.   
 




                                                
for that sort of dedication.  I suspect that Alan was the theory guru of the group, but collectively 
they took on a difficult task: bad data, bad computers and bad to non-existent software.  Again, I 
don’t know the details of the Michigan model, but most of these early modelers wrote their own 
computer code, generally in fortran.  I actually started sitting in on John Whalley’s course for a 
few weeks before I quit after trying to code up an algorithm in fortran.   I got lost somewhere 
between Newton steps and Lemke pivots.  This is nuts I thought.   
5. Nattering nabobs of negativity1   
Over the years, I have heard a lot of criticism and negativity from both theorists and 
econometricians about calibrated simulation modeling; beware, your graduate students talk.  I 
suppose that what bothers me most is that these individuals generally had essentially nothing else 
to offer on the important counter-factual questions such as the income and distributional 
consequences of NAFTA as I just indicated.  Why the nattering? 
 
Perhaps the most puzzling objection to me is the analytical theorist’s “black box” 
criticism used to dismiss simulation modeling and, once you dismiss it, there is of course no 
need to actually learn anything about it.  The black-box criticism essentially says that we do not 
know what is going on inside the computer program and thus we can dismiss and ignore it.  In 
fact, I have generally felt that GE modeling is quite transparent (given lots of dimensions): the 
structure of the models (equation and unknowns) are clear, the functional forms are described in 
detail, the choice of exogenous versus calibrated parameters are clear, and the solution algorithm 
is understood.    
 
A strong and convincing feature of applied general-equilibrium models that I think 
should calm the critics is the “replication check.”  If we begin with a micro-consistent data set, 
then the program must be able to reproduce the input data as an equilibrium.  Not until the model 
passes the replication check will any respectable modeler proceed to actually use the model.  No 
way, no exceptions.  After the replication check, modelers often give their models questions to 
which we know the answer and make sure that the right answer comes back as a further version 
of the replication check.  I certainly do that in my theory simulations.  For example, if I make 
two countries identical, I better get a symmetric solution or I know something is wrong.  While I 
do not write the fortran or C code myself, I certainly do understand exactly what Newton steps 
and Lemke pivots are and how they work. 
 
I don’t think that econometricians typically use the black-box argument, they have other 
objections as noted above.  Nevertheless, I cannot resist speculating that they have little or no 
knowledge of how their canned programs work.  Most never write the code for their estimations 
and don’t have an idea how the code works.  I have been told in discussing this with applied 
 
1The title of this section is from an infamous speech by then US Vice President Spiro T. 





econometricians that there are well-known examples of tests where the same data are submitted 
to different econometrics packages or attempts are made to replicate published papers and the 
results can come back different.  To the best of my knowledge, there is no equivalent of the 
replication check in econometrics, and thus many errors are harder to find than they are in AGE 
modeling. 
 
I regret that there is not a seat at the table for applied general-equilibrium modeling in 
most graduate programs.  At this time, the AGE crowd is fairly disjoint from mainstream 
economics but everyone should understand that it is now a very large crowd indeed.  The Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), the home professional society for modelers, now has 7769 
registered members representing 157 different countries.   Governments take this seriously, 
many corporations or industry groups take this seriously (e.g., the electric power industry is a big 
client of private-sector consulting companies doing GE modeling).  
6. Ways forward?  
To the extent I could make an appeal to fellow theorists, I would simply ask that they 
recognize the limitations of analytical theory.  If you have to make assumptions that throw out 
the interesting part of the question or if the results are extremely fragile to the assumptions you 
choose, then there is a problem.  Once again, I am a strong supporter of the traditional methods 
of analytical theory and continue to do much of my work in this vein.  I am simply suggesting 
that we do not stop there.  What I have often done is to make a model-of-the-model: a simplified 
analytical version of the problem I really want to work on.  An example of a model-of-the-model 
is a partial-equilibrium version of a question which can be solved analytically, and surely the 
author and reader gain some insights from such an exercise.  Then I attack the real GE model via 
general-equilibrium simulations.   
 
I just don’t have enough expertise to comment much on trying to find common ground 
between econometrics and calibrated modeling.  Clearly, there is great need for econometrics in 
estimating parameters that go into applied general-equilibrium models.  Engineering data are 
valuable as well as has been demonstrated in energy modeling; for example, how unprofitable is 
wind or solar energy at today’s prices?  Technologies that are not currently in use, like inactive 
trade links, pose a particular challenge to econometrics.   
 
I do know that there are a number of current papers that could be interpreted as pointing 
in the direction that suggests there is far more overlap between structural econometrics and 
calibrated general-equilibrium modeling than is currently realized.   In a number of recent 
papers, authors are estimating the structural response parameters (e.g., elasticities) by running 
regressions subject to the full GE simulation model.  The regressions cannot be inconsistent with 
the GE, and the parameter estimates are those that minimize the sum of squared errors in the 
econometric objective. This class of problems is called a mathematical program with equilibrium 
constraints (MPEC). That is, optimize something subject to the general equilibrium defined by 
the constraint set, typically a complementarity problem of inequalities with complementary non-




                                                
commodities and factors, and so forth).  
 
Traditionally, MPECs have been used to find an optimal set of policy instruments 
(optimal tax policy), but this numeric method is now being used to estimate structural 
parameters. This method allows us the opportunity to move the benchmark replication up to the 
second order.   This is found in Balistreri and Hillberry (2007, 2008). Working separately Su and 
Judd (2008) advance the MPEC as a general method for direct structural estimation.  Again, it is 
beyond my competence to evaluate this idea in detail, but I hope that it proves to be a fruitful 
avenue for getting the estimators and calibrators to work together. 
7. Conclusions 
I want to conclude by saying well done to Alan and others in the Michigan group, Brown 
and Stern in particular.2  I would go on about Alan’s many important contributions in analytical 
theory which I know more about, but I was asked to comment more narrowly on the simulation 
work which I have now said several times I know less about.  I want to thank Brown, Stern, and 
Deardorff for persisting in the face of huge technical problems and limitations as well as in the 
face of the intellectual resistance I discussed earlier.  I am sure that Von Neumann would be 
proud of you, though apparently he was not the great human being that everyone knows Alan is. 
  
 
Thanks for the invitation and my very best wishes. 
 






Balistreri, Edward J and Russell H. Hillberry (2007), “Structural estimation and the border 
puzzle,” Journal of International Economics 72, 451-463. 
 
Balistreri, Edward J. and Russell H. Hillberry (2008), "The Gravity Model: An Illustration Of 
Structural Estimation As Calibration,” Economic  Inquiry, 46, 511-527 
 
Deardorff, Alan V. And Robert M. Stern (1986), The Michigan Model of World Production and 
Trade: Theory and Applications, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Deardoff, Alan V. and Robert M. Stern (1990), Computational Analysis of Global Trading 
Arrangements, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1990 
 
Deardoff, Alan V. and Robert M. Stern (1998), Measurement of Nontariff Barriers,  Ann Arbor, 
MI: The University of Michigan Press. 
 
Harrison, Glen W., Richard Jones, Lawrance J. Kimbell, and Randall Wigle (1993), “How 
Robust is Applied General-Equilibrium Analysis?,” Journal of Policy Modeling 15, 99-
115. 
 
Judd, Kenneth L. (1997), "Computational Economics And Economic Theory: Substitutes Or 
Complements?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 907-942. 
 
Markusen, James R. and Randall Wigle (1989), "Nash Equilibrium Tariffs for the U.S. Canada:  
The Roles of Country Size, Scale Economies, and Capital Mobility," Journal of Political 
Economy 97, 368-386. 
 
Markusen, James R. (2002), Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade, 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Rutherford, Thomas F. (1999), “Extension of GAMS for Complementarity Problems Arising in 
Applied Economic Analysis,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19, 1299-
1995 
 
Su, Che-Lin and Kenneth L. Judd (2008) "Constrained Optimization Approaches to Estimation 
of Structural Models" Discussion papers 1460, Northwestern University, Center for 
Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management.  
 
Computational Modeling and Trade Policy Analysis: Some Key 
















Computational Modeling and Trade Policy Analysis: Some Key 
Contributions of Alan Deardorff 
 
It’s a pleasure to have the opportunity to comment on Alan’s work on computational modeling 
and trade policy analysis. Alan came to this field from highbrow economic theory, where he 
made particularly important contributions on esoteric theoretical issues such as cones of 
diversification. From this background, he and his collaborators made major practical 
contributions to helping build support for some of the most important and far reaching 
agreements—including the Tokyo Round of the GATT; the Uruguay Round of the GATT/WTO, 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Alan’s applied studies took into account many 
of the mind-numbing details of these agreements, and incorporated new developments—such as 
services—where the data were poor and even the theoretical basis for analysis needed to be 
developed from scratch. This contribution by a leading theorist to influential analyses of applied 
policies is very unusual, and deserves high praise.  
 
Some of the key themes and interests in Alan’s long and productive career have been: 
1. Highbrow economic theory 
2. Computational analysis of trade negotiations 
3. Trade in services 
4. Trade and labor, and 
5. Globalization and intellectual property. 
 
In this note, I’ll focus on Alan’s contributions to the computational analysis of trade negotiations.    
 
Alan was, along with Bob Stern, a pioneer in the use of quantitative economic models for the 
analysis of trade negotiations. Beginning in 1973-4, they developed the Michigan model of 
global production, consumption and trade and employed it in pioneering analyses of the 
implications of the Tokyo Round (Deardorf and Stern 1979). This study, produced as a report to 
the Committee on Finance for the United States Senate, calculates the reductions in average 
tariffs implied by the tariff-cutting formula (the famous Swiss formula) and the exceptions from 
this formula allowed during the negotiating process. It then proceeds to calculate the impacts on 
economic welfare, exchange rates, outputs, sectoral employment and other key economic 
variables.  
 
The Michigan model used simpler, linear solution methods than many other models, with the 
advantage that this allowed solution of larger models, and hence more detailed information on 
the sectoral impacts of reforms—information of great interest to many policy makers. In an era 
where modelers needed to be jacks-of-all-trades, this model was originally solved using Fortran 
code written from scratch by Alan. In an era before the large scale collection and harmonization 
of input-output, trade and protection data under the GTAP project (Hertel 1997), Alan and Bob 
1 
 
found it necessary to make the striking assumption that the structure of numerous developing 
countries could be approximated using the available input-output table for Brazil.  
 
A key element of the Michigan Model project was careful documentation of the model, and its 
applications, in volumes such as Deardorff and Stern (1986). Alan and Bob sought, and 
sometimes obtained unsolicited, comments and advice on their model and its results. A key 
feature of their work—and a model for subsequent scholars—was the way they built careful 
responses to these comments into subsequent versions of their models.  
 
The Michigan model was part of the pioneering wave of models that showed the importance of 
taking general equilibrium effects into account when evaluating trade agreements. Taking into 
account cross-price effects, input-market linkages, and market access implications is particularly 
important when considering the effects of thousands of simultaneous tariff changes. Yet most of 
the studies of the Tokyo Round used much simpler techniques that omitted these important 
linkages. A key feature of this modeling effort was the attention paid by Alan and Bob to 
surveying the econometric literature--and estimating directly where necessary—the key 
parameters on which the reliability of their results depended. 
 
The Michigan Model was regularly updated and developed through the 1980s as new software 
became available, and theoretical developments provided new opportunities for enhancement. 
Pioneering work with Drusilla Brown resulted in a new model the Brown-Deardorff-Stern model 
that included key insights from the “new” trade theory, particularly the welfare implications of 
the new trade theory where consumers have a preference for variety. Because it included 
preference for variety only amongst manufactures, this model emphasized the importance of 
liberalizing manufactures, relative to agriculture, and was particularly suited to the analysis of 
liberalization of services trade. 
 
Another key area of interest for Alan has been the liberalization of trade in services. When this 
was first incorporated into international agreements, economists had to rush to catch up. At first, 
the best that could be done was to classify—a process which generated the classification into 
four modes of supply which lives to this day in the General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
However, Brown, Deardorff, Fox and Stern (1996) quickly moved to fill the analytical gap, 
providing measures of the consequences of liberalizing trade in services. To do this, they relied 
heavily on the measures of the extent of liberalization of services trade developed by Alan and 
Bob’s former student, Bernard Hoekman (Hoekman 1996). 
 
Alan’s long and distinguished career and his important contributions to policy analysis provide 
some important lessons for those seeking a brilliant career in analysis and policy. A first lesson is 
the importance of keeping policy work well grounded in—at least motivated and guided by—
economic theory.  A second is the importance of ensuring that the relevant measures of economic 
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distortions are estimated using sound conceptual and empirical measures. A third is to carefully 
examine the features of any agreements under analysis—as the devil can be thoroughly 
embedded in the details. A fourth is surely the desirability of having a great seminar series like 
the Michigan research seminar in international economics. A fifth is to have great graduate 
students like the many presenting in this seminar. A sixth lesson is surely the desirability of 
seeking feedback and criticism, and taking it on board in subsequent phases of project work. A 
final, and most important, lesson is surely the importance of being a delightful, humorous and 
slightly eccentric colleague and friend to all.  
 
Of course, our hypothetical scholar also has the opportunity to stand on the shoulders of Alan 
and his cohort. Anyone seeking to follow Alan in using computable general equilibrium analysis 
has many advantages. Perhaps foremost is the development of the GTAP database (Hertel 1997) 
that frees the researcher from the need to become a master of the intricacies of input-output 
databases, and their concordance with databases on trade and protection. Another advantage is 
the availability of software suites such as GAMS and GEMPACK specifically designed for 
solving large scale models. Protection databases such as MAcMAPs have also advanced in leaps 
and bounds, allowing us to capture the intricacies of preferential trade regimes. And new 
aggregation schemes (Bach and Martin 2001; Anderson 2009) allow us to avoid the errors 
inherent in using crude trade-weighted averages. A key challenge of the moment is to include the 
insights of the new-new trade theory (Melitz 2003) where the implications of heterogeneity in 
firms and other actors are taken into account, and extensive-margin adjustments to the range of 
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